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This study focuses on the role of oil in the South Sudan conflict in 2013–2014. The study consists 
of a description of the history of the conflict and a qualitative content analysis of the statements of 
the conflict parties, published in news websites Sudan Tribune and Bloomberg. The main 
conclusion is that oil has a role in the conflict: the government, which receives most of its revenues 
from oil, finances its war efforts with oil money, which has politicized the meaning of oil in the 
conflict context and made oil fields strategic targets to the rebels. Whether ensuring the access to oil 
money is a root cause of the conflict, needs to be researched further. Oil dependence of South 
Sudan is, however, a serious problem which should be addressed once peace is restored. Regional 
and international actors involved in the South Sudanese oil industry are in the key position in 
pressuring the conflict parties to peace.  
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INTRODUCTION
 
 
The South Sudan conflict, which started on 15 December 2013, is one of the severest 
humanitarian crises in the world at the moment. The root causes of the conflict can be found 
in the political power struggle between President Salva Kiir and his former vice president, 
Riek Machar, internal divisions of the ruling party SPLM and ethnic tensions. 
 
In this study, I focus only on one of the aspects of the conflict: oil. South Sudan is one of the 
poorest countries in the world, and it is completely dependent on oil, of which the government 
receives 70 % of its revenues (African Economic Outlook 2014, 2). South Sudan needs its oil 
wealth for development and poverty alleviation, but during the conflict, oil fields have been 
targeted by the rebels and the oil production has fallen dramatically (ICG 2014a). Therefore, 
it is important to research how oil is linked to the conflict and whether oil had a role in the 
outbreak of the conflict. 
 
Relations between natural resources and civil wars have been studied at least since 1990s. 
One of the most notable theories of this relation is Collier and Hoeffler’s (2001) model or the 
“greed vs. grievance” theory, which, despite many critics, has also inspired further research 
which elaborates causal relations and characteristics of natural resources and civil wars. 
Another way to analyze relations between natural resources and conflicts is the concept of 
resource curse, which links the weak economic development to the fragility of state, and 
therefore, to civil wars. 
 
The link between the natural resources and civil wars has been established, even though the 
actual mechanisms affecting it are contested. Many of the studies of natural resources and 
conflicts are quantitative and use large amounts of national-level data in order to generalize. 
Nevertheless, the statistical analysis cannot reliably answer all questions. The mere existence 
of natural resources in a conflict-torn country does not tell whether the natural resources are 
linked to the civil war at all (Buhaug, Gates & Lujala 2009, 566); the more important aspect 
in linking natural resource extraction and civil war is how the main actors in a conflict 
interpret the situation (Aspinall 2007, 952). 
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In addition to the practical matter of oil politics, my research contributes to the debate about 
the statehood and state fragility. South Sudan is ranked as the most fragile state in the world 
(Fund For Peace 2014), and there is evidence of weak state structures affecting to the 
outbreak of the conflict (e.g. Radon & Logan 2014). On the other hand, Hagmann and Péclard 
(2010) criticize the state fragility idea for judging the African states for not following the 
Western ideal. According to them, the African state is more complex than the Western ideal 
state as a monopoly over violence in a certain territory: it is a dynamic process in which 
various actors negotiate constantly evolving power relations. Alternative way to look at the 
South Sudan conflict is to analyze it as a negotiating process in which various actors justify 
their claims to power using certain repertoires (e.g. propaganda) and use different resources 
(e.g. oil money) to achieve and legitimize the dominant position. 
 
I study the role of oil in the South Sudan conflict qualitatively. The first step is to create a 
“thick, detailed description” of the sequences of the conflict (Collier, Hoeffler & Sambanis 
2005, 1) and then, to study the statements of the government and the rebels in order to find 
out how the concerned actors themselves articulate the relation of a natural resource and the 
conflict. I focus on the statements of the representatives of the main belligerents because 
while they are not the only relevant players, they are still the most important actors of the 
conflict and the peace process: they are the ones whose power struggle was a starting point of 
the conflict, and being at the center of the peace negotiations, they are in position to find a 
solution. 
 
I analyze news articles of two news websites, Sudan Tribune and Bloomberg, which have 
published interviews and speeches of the both conflict parties since the beginning of the 
conflict. They are the most logical choice for catching most of the oil-related statements 
regarding South Sudan, because Sudan Tribune publishes statements of both the government 
and the opposition and Bloomberg follows closely how the situation in the country impacts oil 
industry. 
 
My research questions are: 
 
1) In which ways oil and the conflict are connected by the representatives of the 
government and the rebels in the published statements, and how they reflect the wider 
social and political context? 
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2) Do different actors use different meanings, and if they do, in which ways? 
 
In the first chapter, I discuss theoretical insights regarding the relation between natural 
resources and conflict. I begin with the “greed vs. grievance” theory and its empirical 
findings, its critics and other studies that have elaborated the empirical findings. Next, I turn 
to address resource curse and its connections to the conflicts. It must be emphasized that in 
this research, I focus on civil wars, even though in the case of the Horn of Africa, almost all 
local tensions and strives have an international element (Mesfin 2013, 11), and South Sudan is 
not an exception (ICG 2014a). 
 
In the second chapter, I cover the history of South Sudan and the evolution of the South 
Sudanese oil industry. This enables perceiving the current conflict and the state of the 
economy of South Sudan in a wider context. 
 
In the third chapter, I introduce the material and the method. In addition to introducing the 
news websites, Sudan Tribune and Bloomberg, and the criteria of selecting pieces of news 
into my sample, I discuss problems related to using media texts as a material, especially in a 
conflict context. For the purposes of finding a main message from the media texts, I have 
chosen qualitative content analysis as my method. Content analysis has common roots in mass 
media research (Krippendorff 2004, 5–7) and war-time propaganda research (ibid, 8–10). 
 
In the fourth chapter, I introduce the results of the analysis. It seems that oil has a role in the 
South Sudan conflict, even though its meaning is different to the government and to the 
rebels. For this reason, and because of the different audiences, the oil-related statements of the 
conflict parties are analyzed separately.  
 
In the fifth chapter, I discuss the results of the analysis and connect it to the theoretical 
background. The main conclusion is that oil has a role in the conflict: the government, which 
receives most of its revenues from oil, finances its war efforts with oil money, which has 
made oil fields strategic targets to the rebels. The importance of oil can be seen also in the 
regional and international involvement in the conflict and in the government’s assurances of 
its capability of defending the oil fields. As the political system in South Sudan is corrupted, it 
is also possible that ensuring the access to oil money is a root cause of the conflict. This 
argument is difficult to prove or disprove, because if the ultimate motive were purely 
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economic interests, the conflict parties would never say it in public. This issue should be 
researched further. 
 
The sixth chapter is a conclusion in which the main ideas of the study are presented briefly. It 
seems that oil has several roles in the conflict: it contributes indirectly to the outbreak of the 
conflict and is a strategic resource and legitimate target during the conflict, as well as a tool 
for propaganda. Although it seems that the resource curse theory might be accurate in the case 
of South Sudan, the applicability of the “greed vs. grievance” model is not that clear: the risk 
factors of the model exist, but the mechanisms linking oil to the conflict appears to be more 
complex than described in the research literature. The results also implicate that the economic 
importance of oil is a reason why oil has become such an essential part of the conflict, which 
means that in order to avoid situations such as this in the future, diversifying the economy 
should be a top priority. 
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1 NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONFLICTS 
 
Civil wars have become one of the major threats to global peace and security, and other than 
military factors, such as the environment, poverty and natural resources have became relevant 
aspects of security. The UN Security Council has recognized that natural resources may 
contribute to outbreak, escalation and prolongation of conflicts, and thus, the Security Council 
stresses the importance of good governance of natural resources (UNSC 2007). Although 
natural resources are seldom, if ever, the sole reason for conflict, they have played a role in at 
least 18 conflicts since 1990s (UNEP 2009, 8). 
 
There is, however, a lack of unanimity about the role of natural resources in the conflicts. 
Discrepancies exist in the strength of the connection between the conflicts and also about the 
actual causal mechanisms behind the connection. In this chapter, I introduce two major 
theoretical standpoints regarding the role of natural resources in civil wars: the “greed vs. 
grievance” model and the resource curse theory. These theories are the most relevant ones for 
my research, as I focus on the economic aspect of the South Sudan conflict. 
 
1.1 Economic explanation of civil wars 1: “Greed vs. grievance” 
 
“Greed vs. grievance”, an econometric model developed by Collier and Hoeffler (2001), is an 
attempt to prove that it is an opportunity rather than a motive which is most often the decisive 
factor in the civil war onset. In contrast to political science explanations for civil wars, Collier 
and Hoeffler argue that just a mere motive to rebel is not a satisfactory explanation, but that 
also atypical circumstances that make the rebellion feasible have to be explained as well (ibid, 
1; Collier et al. 2003, 57–8). 
 
Within this model, a civil war is defined by the existence of an identifiable rebel group 
challenging the government, with at least 5 % of casualties on each side (Collier & Hoeffler 
2001, 3). Civil wars are understood as an economic activity born out of circumstances where 
the cost of rebellion is low and where there are chances to generate income. According to 
Collier and Hoeffler (2001, 16), these circumstances include the possibility to fund a 
rebellion, for example through natural resource exploitation or financing by diasporas, and 
low costs of enlisting rebels, consisting of availability of uneducated young males, low 
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growth rate and low mean income per capita. Other issues which provide opportunities for 
rebels are a cheap price of conflict-specific capital, social cohesion and a military advantage 
through dispersed population and a rough terrain (ibid, 17). Tested against the proxies of 
motive and grievance, such as inequality, political rights, ethnic polarization and religious 
fractionalization, Collier and Hoeffler found that the opportunity proxies are more significant 
in predicting the risk of civil war (ibid, 17). 
 
Even though the financing of the rebellion is only one of the aspects of the greed vs. 
grievance model, it is the most relevant from the point of view of my research. The rebel 
groups are political, military and business organizations that need substantial financing in 
order to challenge the government (Collier et al. 2003, 56). After the end of the Cold War, 
most rebel groups have to find funding from sources other than from the rival superpowers, 
and the regional governments have increased their donations to the rebel groups (ibid, 74). 
Other sources for funding are donations from diaspora or foreign governments, kidnappings 
and ransoms, exploitation of natural resources or selling the extraction rights of natural 
resources which they do not yet control (ibid, 74–77; Ross 2003, 30–35). 
 
Exploitation of natural resources, such as diamonds, gold or oil, is a logical choice of business 
for rebels. Natural resources have unusually high revenues and the production is tied to a 
specific area without the possibility to relocate it, which means that they are relatively easily 
exploited and looted (Ross 2003, 30–31). Exploiting natural resources does not necessarily 
require more than gaining military control over the production areas, which the rebel groups 
as military organizations can easily manage (Collier et al. 2003, 75). Even when some 
extractive industries require technologies too sophisticated for the rebels to use, the 
multinational corporations responsible for extraction can be targeted by the rebels, for 
example they can threaten the infrastructure and demand protection money (ibid, 75–77). 
 
In fact, the rebels do not have to be in control of the production areas in order to generate 
income from natural resources. The rebels are able to sell advance rights to the exploitation of 
resources that they do not yet control, but the control of which they plan to fight for, with the 
help of finance from the buyers of advance rights (Collier et al. 2003, 77). These advance 
rights, or “booty futures”, may be even more dangerous than direct looting, because they may 
prolong the conflict by giving a chance of finance to groups that might otherwise be forced to 
surrender (Ross 2003, 32–33). The booty futures are not only desperate measures for rebel 
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groups, but also legitimate governments have used them when the rebels have seriously 
threatened their position (ibid, 34–35). 
 
1.1.1 Elaboration of the greed vs. grievance model 
 
Several researchers have elaborated the findings and theoretical model of Collier and Hoeffler 
by examining how characteristics and location of a natural resource, as well as different socio-
economic linkages of resource production or extraction affect the dynamics of a conflict. 
 
Auty (2004) emphasizes the economic linkages of exploitation of natural resources: some of 
the resources, based on their form and characteristics, are more likely to fuel civil wars than 
others. One of the characteristics is whether they are concentrated in one area (point resource) 
or scattered over wider region (diffuse resource). According to Auty, point resources such as 
high-tech mineral mining increase the risk of conflict, because due to their capital-intensity, 
imported technology and small work-force, they do not have socio-economical linkages to the 
rest of society and only the rents contribute to the economy. Another aspect is the 
value/weight ratio: for example drugs and alluvial diamonds have low production costs, high 
prices and they are easily moved, which makes them much more “lootable” than “bulk 
commodities” such as oil and copper. The proximity of a porous international border is the 
third socio-economic linkage which facilitates rebels’ access to the international markets to 
gain revenue from their plunder. 
 
On the other hand, Le Billon (2001) introduces a taxonomy of natural resources which, 
according to him, is associated with the type of civil war. Natural resources can be classified 
according to whether they are located near or far from the centre of power (proximate or 
distant resources) and if they are concentrated in one area or scattered in larger areas (point or 
diffuse resources; the concept is from Auty, see above). If there is a civil war, in the case of a 
point and proximate resource, such as an oil field next to the capital, the civil war is probably 
a coup, as in order to gain control over such a proximate and probably well-protected 
resource, a rebel group has to capture the state apparatus. On the other hand, in the case of a 
scattered distant resource, such as alluvial diamonds widely scattered over remote areas, a 
civil war is probably a fight between warlords, who benefit from easily accessible natural 
resources which governments find difficult to protect. 
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Lujala (2010) and Buhaug, Gates and Lujala (2009) emphasize the importance of researching 
the location of natural resources and their relation to conflicts. They (Buhaug, Gates & Lujala 
2009, 566) criticize research using only national-level statistical data of natural resources in 
certain countries and comparing them to data of civil wars, without finding whether natural 
resources are actually relevant to the civil war at all. Therefore, Lujala (2010) has researched 
relations between conflict severity, measured by a number of combat deaths, and the location 
of natural resources on a conflict zone, and found that gemstone mining and hydrocarbon 
production increases the number of battle deaths. Buhaug, Gates and Lujala (2009) analyzed 
the impact of geographical issues, such as proximity of an international border and an access 
to natural resources, on the duration of civil war. They found that a production of natural 
resources in a conflict zone during a conflict prolongs a civil war, which supported their 
hypothesis that the location of natural resources matter in conflict dynamics. 
 
1.1.2 Critics of the “greed vs. grievance” model 
 
Collier and Hoeffler’s findings about the relationship between natural resources and civil war 
have received much attention from media, policy-makers and also from other scholars, some 
of whom have been very critical of their work and some of whom have elaborated their model 
(e.g. Ross 2004a; Fearon 2005; Humphreys 2005). It has been even argued that in the research 
of civil war economics, the role of natural resources has been exaggerated and that other, 
more diverse ways of financing war has been neglected (Wennman 2007). This direction is, 
perhaps, justified, because much of the further research by Collier and Hoeffler as well as the 
critics are focused on the role of natural resources. On the other hand, one has to remember 
that even though the role of natural resources was one of the major findings of Collier and 
Hoeffler, their model was much more comprehensive than the critical scholars give credit for. 
As presented in the original texts (e.g. Collier & Hoeffler 2001 and Collier, Hoeffler & 
Sambanis 2005), their model is based on a diverse array of different variables of opportunity 
or conditions which make a rebellion financially feasible or even attractive, and natural 
resources  were an important, but not the only predictor of civil war. 
 
The sharpest criticism, however, is focused on the statistical relationship between natural 
resources and civil wars. Several researchers (Ross 2004a; Fearon 2005) have challenged the 
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robustness of the statistical findings of Collier and Hoeffler. To begin with, there are concerns 
that the suggested correlation runs in the opposite direction to that which has been assumed: 
perhaps a civil war, or low-intensity violence prior to it, drives away manufacturing sector 
and thus makes the state dependent on natural resource exploitation which cannot be relocated 
(Ross 2004b, 338; Humphreys 2005, 510). Ross (2004b) reports of several studies in which 
Collier and Hoeffler’s research has been replicated with varying results. Such results, some of 
which do not indicate any significant correlation at all, can, according to Ross, be the result of 
different datasets and timeframes used by the researchers or of too broad a category of 
“primary commodity exports”. One possibility is that the association simply is not robust. 
Fearon (2005) finds that the correlation between natural resources and civil war is much 
weaker than suggested by Collier and Hoeffler. Even where there is a correlation it is most 
likely due to oil exports than to primary commodity exports in general; according to him, the 
mechanism linking oil and conflict is probably weakness of state institutions. Even the data 
used by Collier and Hoeffler is criticized by Humphreys (2005, 522), who points out that 
Collier and Hoeffler’s proxy for natural resources, the share of primary commodity exports in 
GDP, does not include the most likely conflict resources, drugs and diamonds.  
 
The most prominent assumed mechanism by which natural resources affect the risk of civil 
war is looting by rebels as a way to finance war or covering its “start-up” costs. This 
mechanism is questioned. In his econometric cross-national study, Humphreys (2005) has 
identified several possible causal mechanisms linking natural resources and civil wars. He 
does not find support for the assumption that rebellions are started in order to benefit from 
natural resources or that the rebels attempt to capture a state or secede because of the 
possibility of gaining control over natural resource wealth. On the other hand, he argues that 
the real link between natural resources and civil war is not the “availability of lootable 
resources”, but more likely the negative impact of primary commodity dependence on the 
structure of the economy. On the other hand, Ross (2004a), even though he also finds no 
evidence to support the view that looting natural resources would affect the onset of civil war, 
argues that looting natural resources seems to be more associated with the duration of the 
conflict, lengthening some conflicts and shortening others. Furthermore, he found additional 
mechanisms, such as the increased risk of external intervention because of natural resources 
or the pre-emptive repression of resource-rich areas by the government. 
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Even though Collier and Hoeffler’s model has received criticism, it has been admitted that 
despite the shortcomings of the statistical evidence, the basic idea behind the theory is correct: 
if there is funding available to the rebels, the risk of civil war is probably higher (Fearon 
2005, 486). Ross (2004a, 35) even admits that the correlation exists, even though there are 
disagreements about the causal mechanisms behind it. He also reports some regular patterns 
found in earlier studies, such as that the association of oil exports with the onset of conflict, 
and the correlation of drugs and gemstones with the duration of conflict (Ross 2004b, 338).  
 
The obvious problem with the “greed vs. grievance” studies and their critics is that most are 
quantitative studies with large-scale data with the intention to find a general theory about the 
role of the natural resources in conflicts. First, there are several conflicts and civil wars in the 
world that have nothing do with natural resources, such as Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka; 
and there is evidence supporting the idea that natural resource conflicts might only be a subset 
of conflicts (Ross 2004b, 341). Second, quantitative data itself is not necessarily the best way 
to assess the role of natural resources in conflicts. National-level data of natural resources in a 
country torn by civil war does not tell whether the natural resources are linked to the civil war 
at all (Buhaug, Gates & Lujala 2009, 566). Natural resources themselves are not a reason of 
conflict, but how the local actors interpret their meaning in certain context may legitimize a 
rebellion (Aspinall 2007): how natural resources become source of conflict is politics, and in 
order to study it, one has to go beyond the statistics. Qualitative research, with detailed 
descriptions to track down the sequences of the conflict, would be useful for finding out the 
actual mechanisms by which natural resources affect the certain conflicts (Collier, Hoeffler & 
Sambanis 2005, 1). 
 
1.2 Economic explanation of civil wars 2: Resource curse 
 
Another possible way to link natural resources and civil wars is resource curse: conflicts may 
be only one of the negative consequences of poor management of abundant natural resources 
(Ross 2004b, 350–351). In this case, civil wars would not be fought because of greed of 
rebels and feasibility of rebellion, but rather because of incapability of weak states to resolve 
social problems and to control their territory (Ross 2003, 24–25). The findings of Fearon 
(2005) and Humphreys (2005) actually suggest that primary reasons for resource conflicts 
might be found in the structures of economy and weakness of state.  
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Originally, the finding of slower economic growth of natural resource dependent countries 
was made and elaborated by economists, such as Auty (1998) and Sachs and Warner (1997). 
Only later, the concept was captured by researchers interested in natural resources and 
conflicts (e.g. Ross 2003, Dunning 2005) as a part of a “political turn”, increased interest in 
the mechanisms behind the correlations (Ron 2005). This happened also vice versa: 
economists, such as Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz (2007, 13–14) have included conflicts in 
their studies of resource curse. 
 
1.2.1 What is resource curse? 
 
Resource curse is a paradoxical situation where some resource-rich countries have weaker 
economical development and poorer governance than the countries with fewer resources 
(Humphreys, Sachs & Stiglitz 2007, 1). In the late nineteenth century, natural resources were 
a prerequisite for industrialization and economic development (Sachs & Warner 1997, 3), but 
as the shipping costs of resources declined, the resource-rich countries lost their comparative 
advantage to countries with fewer resources (Auty 1998, 37–38). However, reasons for why 
large natural resource endowments become in some cases an obstacle for economic 
development are more complex. 
 
The adverse effects of resource curse are based on distinctive features of the natural resource 
extraction industry and the economic incentives and political consequences which it causes 
(Humphreys, Sachs & Stiglitz 2007, 3–4). Resource extraction is an economic “enclave” 
because the extraction industry can operate without forging links to other parts of economy, 
without large domestic work force or even without the cooperation of local population (ibid, 
4). The economic incentives are caused by rents, or unearned rewards for control or 
ownership of natural resources, which the government receives as royalties or taxes by 
corporations without involvement of the population (McFerson 2010, 344). 
 
One of the economic effects of resource curse is the so-called Dutch disease. The Dutch 
disease means a negative impact of sudden increase of income of state, often linked to 
discoveries of natural resources (Ebrahim-zadeh 2003). The increased flow of foreign 
currency, e.g. oil earnings, leads to increased public and private spending, which raises 
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sharply the real exchange rate, which, in turn, causes the decline of non-resource export 
sectors and at the same time raises demand on non-traded goods, such as local services (idib; 
Sachs 2007, 181–182). This decline happens because the real exchange rate appreciation 
weakens the competitiveness of the non-resource sector (Ebrahim-zadeh 2003) and because 
labor and capital shift from export-oriented industries to domestic non-traded sector and to 
resource sector (Sachs 2007, 183; Ebrahim-zadeh 2003). Even though it is debatable whether 
the Dutch disease is a harmful “disease” at all, it is clear that every economic transition is 
painful politically and economically (Humphreys, Sachs & Stiglitz 2007, 6), especially if the 
declining industries used to contribute significantly to the economic growth (Sachs 2007, 
183–184). 
 
Another economic problem that comes with dependence on natural resources is volatility of 
prices and revenue collection, which causes further problems. Especially timing of earnings is 
problematic, because within the natural resource industry, the rate of extraction can differ and 
also the timing of payments by corporations often is irregular, for example due to tax 
exemptions (Humphreys, Sachs & Stiglitz 2007, 6). In addition, the prices of primary 
commodities, especially oil, are highly volatile: oil prices can change 5–10 % in a week (ibid, 
7). Volatility of earnings means that resource-dependent countries have difficulties in long-
term planning, which usually leads to high expenditures in the boom years and deep cuts in 
bust years, often worsened by increased lending during the good years and difficulties in debt 
service in bad years (ibid, 8; Shaxson 2005, 312). Volatility also raises interest rates and non-
resource productive sectors are damaged by the Dutch disease phenomenon during the boom 
years (Shaxson 2005, 312). 
 
The characteristics of natural resource wealth also have an impact on how the wealth is used. 
Usually, the valuable natural resources are nonrenewable, which means that by spending 
revenues from natural resources a country is “living off its capital” (Humphreys, Sachs & 
Stiglitz 2007, 8–9). Another problem arises with large amounts of revenue, since politicians, 
especially if they have uncertain hold to power, are tempted to spend it sooner than later in 
order to pursue short-term political objectives instead of investing revenues in longer-term 
economic development (ibid). Furthermore, if a state relies on natural resources for its 
revenue, it usually neglects investing in education and in creating a diverse skillful workforce, 
without which diversification of economy is impossible (ibid, 10). 
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In addition to economic problems, natural resource wealth also has an impact on politics: 
countries dependent on natural resources tend to be weaker, more unstable and less 
democratic than other countries (Humphreys, Sachs & Stiglitz 2007, 10). The core problem is 
rents, the large amounts of unearned wealth brought by natural resource extraction.  A 
government which relies on natural resource rents is not dependent on raising revenue by 
taxation, which means that the government does not have to face demands of their citizens 
and create robust governance institutions (Karl 2007, 260–261) and that the citizens do not 
have means to pressure or monitor their government (ibid, 264–265). Without checks and 
balances, the government is free to spend its expenditure in ways which serve only its own 
interests at the expense of the population, encouraging rent-seeking behavior, corruption and 
patronage politics (ibid, 264–265). Low legitimacy and inefficient institutions enhances also 
the power of the neo-patrimonial networks, informal networks based on patronage relations 
and ethnic or other types of ties, which function parallel to state structures and increase 
corruption and nepotism (McFerson 2010, 342–323). 
 
On the other hand, the resource curse thesis has been also criticized, for example because of 
its inability to explain the huge variation between the performances of resource-rich countries. 
The critics have presented different options which might explain the variation. For example, 
Basedau and Lay (2009) have noted that most of the literature on resource curse does not 
make a distinction between resource-abundance and resource-dependence, and suggest that it 
is the dependence on a single primary commodity which causes the problems. On the other 
hand, Di John (2011) argues that the role of politics is crucial in explaining whether natural 
resources become a curse or not, and the analysis of power relations and political issues are 
neglected in the resource curse literature. There is also evidence that the quality of the 
institutions, measured by indices for example for rule of law, bureaucratic quality and lack of 
corruption, has an impact on whether natural resources will accelerate or slow the economic 
growth (Mehlum, Moene & Torvik 2006). 
 
1.2.2 How does resource curse relate to conflicts? 
 
There are several suggested mechanisms by which resource curse can cause conflicts. The 
economic problems caused by resource curse create circumstances for a conflict, or they act 
as a precondition for a civil war (Auty 2004). Corruption, irregular boom and bust cycles and 
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inequality cause grievances, which might exacerbate the existing tensions, such as identity-
based issues (Karl 2007, 268–269). In bad economic situation, it is more likely that people 
challenge their government and it is easier for rebels to recruit (Ross 2003, 21). 
 
One of the mechanisms is the grievances in producing regions. People in producing regions 
may suffer from negative effects of resource extraction, such as health and environmental 
problems, or feel that they have a stronger claim on the resource wealth than the population in 
other parts of the country (Humphreys, Sachs & Stiglitz 2007, 13). Usually, the grievances of 
the producing regions are genuine, because often the people who suffer most about the 
resource extraction tend to be those who get the least rewards (Karl 2007, 268–269). The 
worst-case scenario is that these real or perceived grievances of the population in the 
producing-region may give rise to secessionist claims by giving the population an economic 
incentive to secede (Ross 2003, 27–28). It has also been suggested that if the marginalized 
identity-groups are located in the producing regions, it will increase the risk of a civil war 
(Basedau & Richter 2014, 552). 
 
As it is usually the state leaders who control the resource wealth, the non-state actors may 
have an incentive to capture the state apparatus in order to gain control of the wealth 
(Humphreys, Sachs & Stiglitz 2007, 13–14). The huge economic benefits from getting the 
control of oil revenues might be one of the explanations for higher conflict risk of oil-
producing countries (Fearon 2005, 503–504). 
 
As described above, the resource-abundant countries often have weak state structures and 
institutions for several reasons. It has been argued that the weakness of these institutions is the 
reason for civil wars in resource-rich countries. The governments are unable or unwilling to 
develop institutions that would put the whole country effectively under its control (Fearon 
2005), which means that the government is unable to intervene in social conflicts (Ross 2003, 
25) and reconstitute itself after political upheavals (Karl 2007, 269). In this sense, democracy, 
as a system designed to resolve conflicts peacefully, can be one of the mitigating factors of 
civil war risk in resource-dependent countries (Basedau & Richter 2014, 554). 
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1.2.3 Does resource curse always cause conflicts? 
 
The statistical evidence for the abovementioned mechanisms is mixed. For example, Ross 
(2004a) does not find evidence to support the idea that the grievances of the population in the 
producing regions might cause conflicts. He admits that these grievances are often real, but 
they do not lead to a civil war, unless it is a secessionist war (Ross 2004a, 51–52). 
Nevertheless, Humphreys (2005) finds support for mechanisms of grievance, such as the real 
or perceived injustice suffered by the population in the producing regions and unjust 
distribution of the natural resource wealth. 
 
On the other hand, the effects of the resource curse might also contribute to peace and 
political stability. For example, corruption and inefficient economy do not necessarily cause 
political problems. The governments of resource-rich states can use the resource wealth to 
“buy off” the key segments of the society in order to ensure their compliance (Fjelde 2009). 
The crucial issue in whether a country uses its resource wealth to stabilize the society through 
high military spending, the patronage networks and wide-scale distribution of the wealth is 
whether the country is genuinely resource-rich or just resource-dependent (Basedau &  Lay 
2009). Attempts to diversify the economy might be even dangerous for the political elites in 
resource-rich countries, because the economic prosperity might enable the opposition to 
challenge the government (Dunning 2005). 
 
The resource curse does not affect only the government but also the rebels and the potential 
rebels. For example, Weinstein (2005) argues that the rebel organizations which rely on 
looting of natural resources as their source of finance attract mostly recruits with low 
commitment and short-term goals, which undermines the strength of a rebel organization. In 
addition, the rent-seeking behavior, which is harmful for the cohesion of the society and 
favors competing for personal gain, makes also starting a rebellion more difficult (Fjelde 
2009, 203). 
 
It is clear that there is a huge variation between the stability and prosperity of resource-rich 
countries. Even though the resource curse theory cannot truly explain that variation, it is 
reasonable to assume that the institutions and politics play a role, as suggested by Di John 
(2011) and Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006). The findings of Basedau and Richter (2014), 
focusing on oil production, also support this assumption: according to them, risk of conflict 
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caused by the oil production will be mitigated if the government is capable enough to manage 
potential conflicts through democratic institutions, such as Norway, or to use oil revenues to 
“buy peace”, such as the Persian Gulf countries. It might be possible that resource curse and 
its adverse effects can be just consequences of bad politics. 
 
1.3 Evaluation of the “greed vs. grievance” model and the resource curse theory 
 
Although the resource curse theory has received much criticism, the basic logic behind it is 
rational. Taken into account the huge amounts of money involved, it would be a wonder if 
natural resource industries would not encourage rent-seeking behavior and corruption and 
thus, weaken the state institutions. The resource curse theory, and especially the elaborations 
that emphasize the role of politics, is a justified choice for a theory, at least in explaining the 
indirect effects of oil industry on the conflict outbreak. 
 
Similarly, even though the statistical base of “greed vs. grievance” model is questionable, the 
rationale behind it is sound: the rebels need to finance their activities somehow, and natural 
resources, if available, are a feasible possibility among others. Some of the underlying 
assumptions behind the model are simplistic. For example, it is usually assumed that there is 
only one mechanism functioning at a time even though the cases of resource conflicts are 
often very complex. Another simplistic assumption is the emphasis on looting, the illegal 
acquiring of natural resources by the rebels, while neglecting many other types of possibilities 
on how natural resources are linked to the conflicts. Because of these shortcomings, the study 
of resource conflicts should be complemented with qualitative research. 
 
1.4 Conclusion 
 
There is a certain level of agreement that the natural resources and civil wars are linked, even 
though the researchers disagree on the exact causal mechanisms and the theoretical 
assumptions behind them. The role of natural resources in civil wars has become a paradigm 
inside the research of conflicts (Ron 2005, 443). 
 
Even though the greed vs. grievance model and the resource curse are linked together in many 
studies (e.g. Ross 2003; Dunning 2005), I have made a clear distinction between these two 
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approaches in studying civil wars and natural resources. The resource curse is originally a 
purely economic concept describing the adverse economic effects of natural resource 
abundance. On the other hand, the greed vs. grievance model is an econometric model used to 
predict the risk of civil war, based on economic and social indicators, one of which is the 
share of natural resources in GDP. These two approaches, even though merged with each 
other, have different theoretical assumptions. The “greed vs. grievance” model emphasizes 
rebelling as an economic activity and that the risk of a civil war is high when the costs of 
starting rebellion is low and where there is a possibility of generating income. The resource 
curse, on the other hand, suggests that resource-abundance can lead to economic problems, 
corruption and patronage politics. These, in turn, exacerbate tensions, weaken the institutions 
and create grievances, which might result to a civil war. Within the “greed vs. grievance” 
model, war is business as such; within the resource curse theory, the economic 
mismanagement turns into a political turmoil. 
 
Oil is an important factor in both of the approaches. Especially many of the studies of 
resource curse focus solely on oil or oil and gas (e.g. Karl 2007; Humphreys, Sachs & Stiglitz 
2007; Fjelde 2009). According to Collier, Hoeffler and Sambanis (2005, 16), oil is the single 
most risky primary commodity, whereas Fearon (2005) argues that the oil exports is the actual 
factor that explains the whole correlation between civil war and natural resources. Ross 
(2004b, 338) argues that the link between oil exports and civil war onset is one of the regular 
patterns in the research of natural resources and conflicts. It is clear that oil production does 
not always lead to a conflict (e.g. Fjelde 2009). However, it is reasonable to assume that 
certain issues, such as high dependence on oil and lack of democracy, increase risk of a civil 
war (Basedau & Richter 2014). 
 
South Sudan is an excellent example of an oil-dependent, politically unstable country with 
political and social indicators and economic situation that match with the “symptoms” of the 
resource curse and the risk factors of the “greed vs. grievance” model. Did the conflict of 
South Sudan start because of the low costs of rebellion and a possibility of make profit, or 
because of its corrupted government and weak institutions were unable to prevent violence, or 
because of completely different reasons? In order to find answers, one has to look at the 
history of South Sudan, the South Sudanese oil industry and the roots of the conflict, to which 
I turn in the next chapter. 
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2 SOUTH SUDAN AND OIL 
  
 
After decades of civil war, South Sudan gained its independence from Sudan in 2011 in a 
referendum. Independence did not bring peace and stability to South Sudan, where low-level 
violence, widespread poverty and human rights violations are still common. The SPLM, the 
former liberation movement, now the ruling party of South Sudan, is the dominant institution 
in the country, but it is not and has never been a unified movement. The discrepancies within 
the SPLM are the root cause of the current conflict. 
 
Oil production became a major industry in South Sudan when it first signed the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. The industry, however, suffers from several 
problems, which are the oil-related tensions with Sudan, rampart corruption and lack of 
oversight and monitoring. 
 
2.1.1 The first civil war of Sudan (1955–1972) 
 
The two civil wars of Sudan were fought between the Muslim and Arabic North and the 
Christian, Animist Southern Sudan. The first civil war took place in 1955–1972. The main 
reasons for the Southern rebellion were the economic marginalization and political 
marginalization of the South and religious persecution by the Sudanese government (Atta-
Asamoah, Sharamo & Mwanzia 2011, 2; LeRiche & Arnold 2012, 24–25). Rebellions in the 
South against Northern hegemony started already in 1955 (Ali et al. 2005, 193), but only in 
the 1960s, the first organized rebel movement in the South, an overtly secessionist Anya-nya, 
emerged (ibid, 199). 
 
After a decade of fighting, the war ended because of a military stalemate in 1972 to the Addis 
Ababa Agreement, which granted autonomy to Southern Sudan (LeRiche & Arnold 2012, 27–
28). According to the Agreement, the fighters of Anya-nya were to be integrated into the 
Sudanese army. This provision was problematic, because the rebel soldiers were disappointed 
when they were forced to serve with their old enemies; with other grievances, such as 
deploying the Southern forces in the North and poor living conditions, some of the soldiers 
started to mutiny (ibid, 29–30). In response, the Sudanese president imposed Islamic sharia 
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law on the whole country and declared Arabic as national language, which practically ended 
the Southern autonomy (Atta-Asamoah, Sharamo & Mwanzia 2011, 2). The Southern 
autonomy was also weakened by the changes in the internal boundaries of the South (LeRiche 
& Arnold 2012, 60). These grievances triggered the second civil war in 1983. 
 
2.1.2 The second civil war of Sudan (1983–2005) 
 
The strongest Southern actor in the second civil war was the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement and its military wing, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/A), led by Dr 
John Garang. The SPLM/A was not a cohesive movement: the struggle against the 
government gave a common cause to the people of the South, but it hid ideological 
differences and ethnical tensions (Ali et al. 2005, 201). During the civil war, these ideological, 
political and ethnical tensions have led to the two major bloody splits (Mamdani 2014). The 
internal divisions of the SPLM/A were open to manipulation of the government, which allied 
with splinter factions and other armed groups against the SPLM/A (Le Riche & Arnold 2012, 
44– 45). The SPLM/A was supported by the Ethiopian regime, and thus, adopted Marxist 
rhetoric (Anderson 1999, 70). 
 
The second civil war has been often mistakenly labeled as a secessionist war (e.g. Ross 
2004a, 50–53; Le Billon 2001, 573). The misunderstanding might be caused by the incorrect 
media reports, which throughout the conflict described the SPLM/A as a secessionist 
movement, even though the statements of the movement itself claimed otherwise (Öberg & 
Sollenberg 2011, 51). The goal of the SPLM/A was not a secession, but it pursued Garang’s 
vision of “New Sudan”, a comprehensive reform of a pluralist, secular and democratic Sudan 
(LeRiche & Arnold 2012, 32–33; Anderson 1999, 70–71). The “New Sudan” vision gave the 
SPLM/A a chance to ally with the rebel groups in the North and made the support from the 
Ethiopian regime possible (LeRiche & Arnold 2012, 34). However, the rank and file of the 
SPLM/A was mostly in favor of secessionism, and therefore, the self-determination of the 
South and an option of referendum to independence were always on the agenda of the 
SPLM/A (ibid, 34–38).  
 
Even though the root causes of the second civil war can be found in other issues, oil also 
started to play a role in the war. The first oil companies came to Sudan in 1970s, but the first 
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significant finds were made in the 1980s; in the 1990s, the Western oil companies were 
replaced by the Asian companies and petrodollars started to flow to Sudan (Patey 2014). First, 
oil politics contributed to the outbreak of the conflict (Ross 2004a, 52), and later, it became an 
essential strategic resource to fight for (Ali et al. 2005, 214). 
 
When oil was found in the Southern Sudan, the Sudanese president took every measure to 
keep them under control of the North. For example, he decided that the pipeline would be 
constructed via Port Sudan, via the Northern territory, (Patey 2014, 34). He also attempted to 
move North-South boundary so that the oil wells would be in the North (LeRiche & Arnold 
2012, 68). While this failed, an oil refinery, which was planned to be built in the South, was 
constructed in the North (ibid). The SPLM/A argued that Khartoum was stealing the resources 
of the South (Ross 2004a, 52) and threatened the oil companies to suspend their operations 
(Patey 2014, 38–40). The SPLM/A even deliberately targeted oil companies, which were 
considered as allies of the government (ibid). 
 
Even though many Western oil companies had ceased the operations in Sudan because of 
insecurity, the Chinese oil company CNPC stayed despite civil war and built an oil 
infrastructure in Sudan practically from a scratch with close cooperation with the Sudanese 
government (Patey 2014). The Chinese paid for the protection of the Sudanese army and 
militias (Patey 2014, 107–108). Oil revenues were critical for the government, because the 
government could use it to buy modern weapons, such as attack helicopters and jet fighters, 
and by stabilizing the economy, maintain the support of the Northern elites (LeRiche & 
Arnold 2012, 105). 
 
According to the SPLM/A, oil companies were “legitimate targets”, because the SPLM/A 
argued that the companies were “mercenaries working for the Islamist regime” (Patey 2014, 
107). The rebels attacked the oil fields by sabotaging and bombing them and kidnapped and 
killed some oilmen (ibid, 108–109). The government was able to take advantage of the 
divisions of the Southern front and used the splinter groups of the SPLA and other armed 
groups to fight the SPLM/A especially in the oil producing areas (LeRiche & Arnold 2012, 
100). This strategy helped Khartoum to harass the SPLM/A, keep oil fields secured and 
spread propaganda of alternative Southern groups willing to cooperate with the government 
(ibid). 
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Even though the conflict parties had negotiated throughout the war, only in the late 1990s and 
the early 2000s, realistic chances for peace appeared: both parties saw that they could not win 
militarily, and the Sudanese government was under increasing pressure both internally and 
internationally (LeRiche & Arnold 2012, 105–106). The loss of oil revenues due to war also 
contributed to making peace attractive: because of the war, the government could not use the 
full potential of oil fields, and the Southeners did not benefit at all (ibid, 106). 
 
The ceasefire started in 2002 and the final peace agreement between the Sudanese 
government and the SPLM, Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), was signed in 2005, in 
the same year, when the SPLM/A leader John Garang died accidentally and was followed by 
Salva Kiir, the current president of South Sudan. Under leadership of Kiir, the SPLM 
practically abandoned Garang’s vision of “New Sudan” and started to pursue independence 
(LeRiche & Arnold 2012, 115–116). 
 
CPA included agreements on power-sharing, sharing of oil wealth and ending the conflicts in 
Abyei and South Kordofan, and most importantly, autonomy for Southern Sudan and the 
possibility of independence after a six-year transition period and a referendum (Le Riche & 
Arnold 2012, 108–110). In 2011, after the transition period, the referendum was organized, 
and a vast majority voted for independence (Atta-Asamoah, Sharamo & Mwanzia. 2011, 1). 
South Sudan declared its independence in the same year. 
 
2.2 Challenges of South Sudan after the peace agreement 
 
Neither autonomy nor independence after the six-year interim period brought peace to South 
Sudan. Political disputes inside the SPLM, now the ruling party of South Sudan, widespread 
insecurity due to small-scale rebellions and inter-tribal cattle-raiding and oil-related tensions 
with Sudan have marked the post-CPA period. 
 
2.2.1 South Sudan politics 
 
In South Sudan, power has centered in the SPLM and the president. The political system in 
the country gives unreasonable amount power to the president, who is the head of the 
executive, but not subject to legislative confidence (Radon & Logan 2014, 155–157). Another 
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problem is the dominant position of the SPLM, which has been unable to transform itself into 
a truly political party. Like many other ex-liberation movements, the SPLM has a militaristic 
structure and an autocratic grip on the South Sudanese politics (LeRiche & Arnold 2012, 
218–225); opposition is often responded by violence (Minale 2012, 15).  
 
One of the biggest problems of South Sudan is corruption, which is deeply embedded in the 
country’s political culture (Radon & Logan 2014, 159): political office means an easy access 
to state resources (ibid, 154). It is estimated that South Sudan has lost billions of dollars due 
to corruption, such as fake contracts and excessive salaries of the ministries, in addition to the 
money spent wastefully by the politicians (Patey 2014, 218). 
 
Insecurity due to small-scale rebellions, inter-tribal clashes and cattle raiding is widespread 
(Atta-Asamoah, Sharamo & Mwanzia 2011), and the SPLA, the army, is fractured. President 
Kiir’s “big tent strategy”, absorbing rival armed groups and splinter factions of the army back 
into the SPLA and giving their leaders high positions, created divisions inside the SPLA (ICG 
2014a, 5–6; Atta-Asamoah, Sharamo & Mwanzia 2011, 5). The problem in this approach is 
that it gives the officers an incentive to defect in order to gain even better position when 
returning (LeRiche & Arnold 2012, 235–236), which already has occurred several times 
(Atta-Asamoah, Sharamo & Mwanzia 2011, 6). 
 
Even though the SPLM has put in place basic structures of governance (LeRiche & Arnold 
2012, 220) and created a legislative framework for human rights, rule of law, anti-corruption 
and independent judiciary (Minale 2012, 17), people of South Sudan still face huge social 
problems. The majority of the population lives in poverty: 51 % of the population lives under 
the poverty line of 2 dollars per day (African Economic Outlook 2014, 10; LeRiche & Arnold 
2012, 167), and 85 % of the working population lives on the subsistence economy (World 
Bank 2014b). Among other problems, poor infrastructure, lack of financial services and 
access to credit, low literacy rate of the population (27 %) and questionable judiciary makes 
South Sudan unattractive country for the investors and businesses (African Economic Outlook 
2014, 6). 
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2.2.2 Oil industry 
 
Oil industry is without doubt the dominant and the most important economic sector in South 
Sudan. In 2013–2014, the government received 70 % of its revenues from oil (African 
Economic Outlook 2014, 2), and before the oil shutdown in 2012, the percentage used to be 
98 % (World Bank 2014b). Oil contributes 90 % to the exports of South Sudan (African 
Economic Outlook 2014, 5) and over 60 % to its GDP (ibid, 2). The exact amount of the oil 
production of South Sudan is difficult to estimate because of frequent disruptions on the 
production. However, in 2011, before the shutdown, the average level of production was 
estimated to be 340,000 barrels per day, and during the first half of the year 2014, the amount 
was 150,000 barrels per day (US Energy Information Administration 2014, 7). The pre-oil 
shutdown production amounts made South Sudan the third biggest oil producer in Africa 
(Global Witness 2012, 7). The national-owned oil companies, China’s CNPC, India's Oil and 
Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) and Malaysia's Petronas, are the main stakeholders in the 
oil consortia in South Sudan; South Sudan’s own national oil company, Nilepet, holds minor 
stakes (US Energy Information Administration 2014, 6). 
 
The oil sector of South Sudan has many challenges. According to Global Witness (2012, 1) 
the most severe problems, in addition to over-reliance on oil, are corruption and lack of 
transparency and oversight. Although there is a law that requires publishing information about 
oil revenue and contracts, the Petroleum Act, the law is not implemented (ibid, 9–14). The bill 
which regulates the management of oil revenue and establishes two funds for stabilization of 
oil income and to compensate the future loss of oil resources (Savage 2013) still needs to be 
signed by the president (Global Witness 2014, 3). The oil companies, which have not got used 
to such a heavy regulation, have opposed the bill (Patey 2014, 233). There are also measures 
taken to combat corruption, but the anti-corruption bodies are not offered enough resources 
and institutional independence to investigate and prosecute the suspects (Global Witness 
2012, 25–27). 
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Map 1. The oil producing areas and the oil infrastructure of South Sudan and Sudan. (US 
Energy Information Administration.) 
 
2.2.3 Oil-related issues with Sudan 
 
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005 stated that the oil revenues should be divided 
between the governments of the North and the South, 50 % to each government, minus 2 % to 
the respective oil producing states (LeRiche & Arnold 2012, 128). The government of 
Khartoum was in charge of management of oil money and the SPLM was denied access to the 
contracting and accounting processes (ibid, 128–129; Patey 2014, 210–211). The secretive 
manner in which the oil money was managed caused disputes between the governments, as 
the SPLM suspected that it did not receive its fair share, and despite attempts to resolve the 
dispute, suspicions between the southern and northern officials remained (Patey 2014, 210–
212). 
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After the secession in 2011, two thirds of the Sudanese oilfields were left in the South, which 
means that Sudan lost 55 % of its fiscal revenue and its oil export revenues fell almost by 10 
billion dollars (US Energy Information Administration 2014, 1). Even though South Sudan 
got the most of the oil fields, it was still dependent on the pipelines to the Red Sea port in 
Sudan (Atta-Asamoah 2012, 1–2). Despite expectations of the international community (ibid) 
and contrary to the tenets of the liberal theory, this interdependence did not lead to 
cooperation. 
 
One of the most serious disputes that disturbed the cooperation between Sudan and South 
Sudan was the issue of transit fees. For compensation of the loss of oil revenues, Sudan 
demanded transit fees of 36 dollars per barrel for the use of its pipelines, which was grossly 
overpriced – usually the transit fees are under a dollar per barrel (Patey 2014, 226). When the 
South did not accept the demand, Sudan confiscated oil shipments (which belonged to a 
Chinese company) from the South as a payment of the transit fees, and in response, South 
Sudan halted the oil production completely to gain more leverage in the negotiations with 
Sudan (ibid, 227–228). The oil shutdown seriously damaged the economy of the both 
countries (Atta-Asamoah 2012, 3), and only after months, the compromise was reached in the 
AU-mediated negotiations (Patey 2014, 236). China, a major oil importer, was in a difficult 
position balancing between the two governments (ICG 2012). 
 
In addition, Sudan and South Sudan still have disputed border areas, which has caused 
tensions. Especially the fate of oil-producing areas of Abyei (LeRiche & Arnold 2012, 189) 
and Heglig (Ylönen 2012) has strained the relations between the two countries to the brink of 
war. Even though the tensions still exist, the relations between Khartoum and Juba have 
warmed since 2013 (ICG 2014a, 23–24). 
 
 26 
 
2.3 The conflict of South Sudan 
 
Map 2. South Sudan. (CIA: The World Factbook.) 
 
The current conflict of South Sudan started on 15 December 2013 at the meeting of the 
National Liberation Council of the SPLM in Juba, after a clash between the rival army units 
(Sorbo 2014, 1). President Kiir accused the former Vice-President Riek Machar of a coup 
attempt and arrested several senior politicians who were allegedly involved (ICG 2014a, 1). 
Machar denied the coup attempt and involvement in the clashes in Juba, but later announced 
that he is in charge of the armed opposition called the SPLM/A in Opposition (the SPLM-IO) 
(ibid). Fighting spread to the northern areas of South Sudan and escalated into a full-scale 
civil war (Sorbo 2014). The war has features of an ethnic conflict: both sides have targeted 
people along ethnic lines (ICG 2014a, i). Despite several negotiation rounds mediated by the 
regional body Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD, the conflict is still 
unresolved. 
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Map 3. Much of the fighting has focused on the oil-producing states of South Sudan. 
(Wikipedia Commons; VoA News). 
 
2.3.1 Conflict parties 
 
The SPLM/A has never been a politically or ideologically unified movement. According to 
Mamdani (2014), every split and division of the SPLM/A is most often caused by either 
discrepancies of the direction of the future, or about the politicization of ethnicity. The current 
conflict emerged as a consequence of such a split (ibid). Following the intra-party debates 
about the leadership of the SPLM/A and the future direction of the party, President Kiir 
dismissed Vice-President Riek Machar and majority of the other cabinet members in July 
2013 (ICG 2014a, 3–4). 
 
The dismissed politicians continued their protest by publicly criticizing President Kiir of 
losing the vision and accusing him of “dictatorial tendencies” (ICG 2014a, 4–5). Soon after 
that, the units of the SPLA clashed in Juba following the meeting of the SPLM National 
Liberation Council on 15 December (ibid, 1). It remains contested what happened in reality, 
but Kiir accused Machar and other dismissed politicians of attempting a coup, whereas those 
critical of Kiir argue that the president himself tried to disarm soldiers and officers who were 
believed to be loyal to Machar (Sorbo 2014, 1). Machar denied the coup attempt, but while 
the fighting spread to the northern parts of the country, he announced that he leads the armed 
opposition forces and intends to oust Salva Kiir (ibid). The other dismissed politicians were 
accused of being involved in the coup attempt and they were arrested (ibid). 
 
According to LeRiche (2014), it is inaccurate to claim that the South Sudan conflict would be 
a clear-cut struggle between a government and an opposition: the conflict is about a 
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fragmentation of an ex-liberation movement, in which the personal ambitions are as important 
as the different political agendas. In addition, it is questionable whether Riek Machar is in 
control of the rebel forces (ibid). Acknowledging this, I refer to the opposition forces, which 
affiliate with Riek Machar and fight against Salva Kiir’s government as “rebels”, following 
suit of Collier and Hoeffler (2001, 3) who used the concept of rebels as a group which intends 
to challenge their government. 
 
In addition to the main belligerents, there are also other actors involved in the conflict. The 
politicians, who openly criticized President Kiir and were later arrested, still play a role in the 
conflict. Seven of them were released, and they formed a neutral third block in order to 
participate in the peace negotiations (ICG 2014a, 13). As a non-violent group in between the 
two conflict parties, they offer an opportunity to “bridge the gap” between them, but on the 
other hand, their contribution to the peace talks have been seen as opportunistic (ibid). 
 
Even though the conflict started as a pure power struggle, the forces of both sides have 
targeted people along ethnic lines (Fleischner 2014, 5). Divergent views exist of ethnicization 
of the conflict. For example, International Crisis Group argues that people were targeted 
deliberately and systematically on ethnic basis (ICG 2014a, 11). However, Radon and Logan 
(2014, 150–151) point out that ethnicity hardly played a role in triggering the conflict, 
because the politicians who opposed Kiir in December 2013 represented various ethnic 
groups, some of them even were from Kiir’s own group. According to Radon and Logan 
(2014), it is more likely that ethnic violence is a consequence of ethnic-based patronage 
system. In the similar lines, LeRiche (2014) argues that ethnicization was purely accidental. 
Most of the high-level politicians have body guard forces from their own tribes, as had Riek 
Machar and other politicians who were thought to be involved in a coup attempt. When the 
president sent his forces to arrest them, his soldiers had to neutralize the body guard forces 
and the army units, most of who were from the Nuer tribe. Consequently, the Nuers thought 
that they were been targeted by the Dinkas (because like the other politicians, the president 
too had surrounded himself with his own tribe members). Taken into account the violent 
history of tensed relations between the two tribes (LeRiche & Arnold 2012, 229–231), it is no 
wonder that the situation escalated into a circle of attacks and retaliation (LeRiche 2014). 
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2.3.2 Regional dynamics 
 
Map 4. The countries of the Horn of Africa. (Maps of World, Africa.) 
 
Horn of Africa can be described as a security complex: because of the inter-connectedness of 
the region, one country cannot be secure unless all the others are secure, too (Mesfin 2013). In 
addition, South Sudan is a “critical link in the regional economy” (ICG 2014a, 18). Therefore, 
the other countries are interested in the resolution of the South Sudanese conflict and aim to 
impact on it. 
 
The regional intergovernmental body Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 
has led the peace mediation efforts without much success. Despite many negotiation rounds, 
several separate ceasefire agreements and targeted sanctions by USA and the EU, the fighting 
has not ceased.  Both parties see advantages in delaying or even avoiding negotiations and 
instead finding a military solution (ICG 2014a, 27–28). They have repeatedly breached 
ceasefires (e.g. ICG 2014a, 20; BBC 11.5.2014; BBC 21.7.2014) and at times delayed 
negotiations by boycotting them (Aljazeera 17.6.2014). IGAD has threatened the conflict 
parties with punitive measures, but despite non-compliance of the parties, IGAD has never 
implemented them, which diminishes its credibility and leverage (Fleischner 2014, 2–3; Akol 
2014, 8–9). Neutrality of IGAD has been questioned and it has been accused of deliberate 
siding with the government (Akol 2014, 9) and the role of Uganda has raised suspicions (ibid; 
ICG 2014a, 20–21). In addition, IGAD has been criticized for its failure to promote inclusive 
peace process (Akol 2014). Critiques argue that limiting the peace talks to the government 
and the SPLM/A in Opposition does not help to bring peace, because the other local-level 
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armed groups, most of which are nominally allied to the main conflict parties, are potential 
spoilers (Akol 2014, 4; ICG 2014b) and even though the peace agreement was between the 
main belligerents, its implementation is a collective responsibility (Akol 2014, 4). 
 
Sudan supports openly the government of South Sudan and is actively involved in the IGAD-
mediated peace negotiations (ICG 2014a, 23–24). Sudan has interests in the resolution of the 
conflict, because its economy is dependent on the transit fees South Sudan pays it for using 
the Sudanese pipelines (ibid). It has been speculated, though, that since the stakes are that 
high, Sudan might aid the South Sudanese rebels covertly while publicly supporting the 
government (Gordon 2014, 3; ICG 2014a, 24). The presence of the Sudanese rebel groups in 
the South has strained the relations between the two governments (e.g. Sudan Tribune 
20.5.2014). 
 
Uganda has intervened in the conflict at the request of the government, and according to some 
analysts, the intervention practically saved the government (ICG 2014a, 22–23). Uganda has a 
long and close relationship with the SPLM/A: the Ugandans and the SPLM/A have 
cooperated in the fight against the Ugandan rebel group LRA and Uganda is also the most 
important trade partner of South Sudan (Awolich 2014, 2–3). The Ugandan intervention was 
criticized, because the Ugandan military presence in the country compromises the neutrality 
of IGAD (ICG 2014a, 21) and might risk the regionalization of the conflict by bringing its old 
enemy Khartoum into the conflict (ibid, 24–25), but the intervention of Sudan seems unlikely 
(Awolich 2014). 
 
2.3.3 Consequences of the conflict 
 
The South Sudan conflict is one of the most severe humanitarian crises at the moment and the 
civilians have suffered immensely. Tens of thousands of people have died or injured, and 1.9 
million people have been displaced, most of whom inside the country (UNOCHA 2015, 10). 
Due to collapse of already weak health services, diseases such as cholera have broken out and 
the poor health situation will be worse in this year (ibid, 13). Violence, displacement and loss 
of livelihoods have weakened agricultural production, and thus, 1.5 million people are 
severely malnourished; the number is expected to grow (ibid, 15).  
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According to the Human Rights Watch (2014), both sides of the conflict and their allies have 
committed atrocities against civilians, which might be war crimes or even crimes against 
humanity. The both forces have targeted civilians along ethnic lines, pillaged and destroyed 
their property and attacked places of refuge, such as hospitals and churches, and even the UN 
compounds (ibid). The soldiers responsible for these actions have not been prosecuted, which 
only increases the culture of impunity (ibid). Boys and young men have been forcibly 
recruited, and girls and women are vulnerable to sexual violence (UNOCHA 2015, 10). 
 
Whether intentional or not, the conflict has had straits of ethnic conflict: both sides have 
targeted people along ethnic lines, and ethnic attacks and reprisals have become a dominant 
pattern of the war (HRW 2014). The government has failed to hold the perpetrators 
accountable, and has not even tried to find and prosecute the suspects of the worst incidences 
(ibid). Similarly, the rebel forces have committed atrocities against civilians, and apparently 
there have not been any attempts to investigate or prosecute the suspects (ibid). 
 
Volatile security conditions, especially clashes between the government and the rebel forces, 
have made the delivery of humanitarian aid difficult in many places (USAID 9.2.2015). 
 
The economy has also suffered because of the conflict: it is estimated that South Sudan would 
lose even 15 % of its GDP because of the conflict (World Bank 2014b). If the conflict 
continues for a year to five years, South Sudan might lose even 22–28 billion dollars, plus the 
long-term human costs due to deaths, hunger and disease (Frontier Economics 2015, 5). The 
conflict will also strain the resources of the neighboring countries and the international 
community by tens of billions of dollars (ibid). 
 
The oil production in South Sudan has been partially shut down because of the conflict (US 
Energy Information Administration 2014, 6) and the key oil installations have suffered 
serious damages (ibid, 11). There are different estimates of how much the oil production has 
fallen, for 20 % of the World Bank (2014b) to 30 % of Bloomberg (14.1.2014), but the any 
substantial loss of oil production means that the government revenues will shrink. 
 
There is also a risk that the limited state budget will be diverted from development and 
services to military budget, of which there are examples (Global Witness 2014, 2–3). Global 
Witness (2014) has also encouraged the South Sudan government to issue a moratorium to all 
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new oil contracts in order to protect the oil wealth from hastily made deals which might be 
harmful for South Sudan in the longer term, but the government rejected the proposition 
(Sudan Tribune 28.7.2014). 
 
2.3.4 Conclusion 
 
During its short time of independence, South Sudan has not experienced peace or stability. 
Low-level violence, human rights violations, lack of democracy, oil dependence and 
corruption, and oil-related tensions with Sudan have hampered the development of South 
Sudan, which has remained as one of the poorest countries of the world. The root causes of 
the current conflict can be found in these issues: power struggle within the ruling party SPLM 
provided a spark which the weak state institutions were not able suppress. 
 
Despite several negotiation rounds and agreements, there has not been a durable cease-fire. 
The violence has driven almost two million people from their homes and left thousands of 
people dead and injured. In addition, economic losses due to fighting are huge and the oil 
industry, the main industry of South Sudan, has been seriously damaged. 
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3 CONTENT ANALYSIS AND PIECES OF NEWS AS MATERIAL 
 
As method, I will use qualitative content analysis, which is a basic method of all types of 
qualitative research and on which much of the qualitative research is based (Tuomi & 
Sarajärvi 2009, 91). Content analysis is a systematic way to categorize material and to create a 
concise picture of a phenomenon in order to draw conclusions about it (ibid, 103). Content 
analysis means that the material is divided into pieces, then conceptualized and then compiled 
into a logic, coherent entity (ibid, 108). 
 
Content analysis is a suitable method for analyzing different types of texts, including articles 
(Tuomi & Sarajärvi, 2009, 103). In fact, content analysis has long common roots with mass 
media and war-time propaganda research (Krippendorff 2004, 5–10). Content analysis differs 
from discourse analysis in a sense that with content analysis, it is important to seek meanings 
in the text and not how the meaning is constructed (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, 104). This way, 
it is a logical choice of method, because my material consists of secondary sources and thus, 
the goal of my research is to find the message of the speakers and not concentrate on how that 
meaning behind the message is created by journalists. 
 
3.1.1 Qualitative and quantitative content analysis 
 
There are two different types of content analysis: qualitative and quantitative. Tuomi and 
Sarajärvi (2009, 105–107) make a clear distinction between quantitative and qualitative 
content analysis: quantitative content analysis is based on counting frequencies of words and 
sentences, whereas qualitative content analysis describes the content of the document 
verbally. According to them, qualitative and quantitative content analysis of similar material 
can yield completely different results, and that the results by qualitative analysis are more 
reliable. 
 
Krippendorff, on the other hand, finds this distinction artificial: the basic idea of analysis 
process is similar even though the research design is different. In both ways of doing content 
analysis, one has to analyze texts, which is an inherently interpretative activity, to divide the 
texts into smaller units and contextualize them (Krippendorff 2004, 87). He admits, however, 
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that for researching political information (2004, 10) or mapping the multiple perspectives or 
voices (2004, 88) the qualitative research design is better than quantitative. 
 
3.1.2 Approaches of content analysis 
 
There are different ways of approaching content analysis and the relationship between a 
theory and an analysis. One way is to make a distinction between material-driven, theory-
driven and theory-tied approaches (Eskola 2010, 182). Theory-driven analysis means that the 
starting point of a research is a theory and the material is only used to test hypotheses derived 
from the theory (Eskola 2010, 182–183). Material-driven approach means that there is no 
theory guiding analysis, but a theory is constructed from a material (Eskola 2010, 182). This 
is problematic, because it is practically impossible to make pure observations from the data, 
taking into account that the research setting and the presuppositions of a researcher will affect 
to the results (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, 96). There is also a middle ground between the two: 
theory-tied analysis, which means that the analysis has theoretical connections, but it is not 
strictly based on any theory (ibid). Essentially, theory-tied analysis is similar to material-
driven analysis, but the difference is how the results are linked to a theory in the end of the 
research (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, 96–97). 
 
These different approaches have been linked to the different chains of logical reasoning. 
Theory-driven is close to the deductive reasoning, from general to specific, whereas material-
driven is inductive, from specific to the general (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, 96–98; Elo & 
Kyngäs 2008, 109–112). Theory-tied analysis, on the other hand, is close to the abductive 
reasoning, where the researcher aims to combine the general theory and the single 
observations creatively (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, 97). 
 
The other typology of approaches is the text-driven, problem-driven and the method-driven 
analyses, which are different starting points for the research (Krippendorff 2004, 340). Text-
driven analysis starts from the interesting body of texts, which the researcher goes through 
without an explicit research puzzle in mind: the research questions evolve at the same time 
with the analysis (ibid, 340–342). It resembles the material-driven approach in the sense that 
the analysis and interpretation of the material are the essential part and the theoretical 
background has not so much meaning. Problem-driven analysis starts with the research puzzle 
 35 
 
which guides the research process (ibid, 340). This approach seems to be the basic starting 
point for research in general. The last starting point is method-driven analysis, which means 
that the topics and research questions are selected in order to be able to use the usual method 
(ibid). 
 
My research is problem-driven, because the research question, the role of oil in the South 
Sudan conflict, guides all the phases of the research process. According to the typology of 
Tuomi and Sarajärvi (2009), my research is a mixture of material-driven and theory-tied 
analysis. The main difference between the two is that in the material-driven approach, the 
categories are created from the material, whereas in theory-tied analysis, the categories are 
borrowed from a theory (ibid, 117). In the analysis, I create the categories myself, according 
to the material, which would suggest that my research resembles the material-driven 
approach. On the other hand, pure material-driven analysis would require that no prior 
knowledge or theory would affect to the results of the analysis or its realization (ibid, 95). 
However, I cannot deny that the prior knowledge about the political context of South Sudan 
and its oil industry, as well as the theoretical concepts, had not affected to the analysis process 
or the results. 
 
3.1.3 The phases of content analysis 
 
Before starting the analysis, the first task is to define the unit of analysis, which can be, for 
example, a word, a sentence or an idea consisting of several sentences (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 
2009, 110), or a theme or a meaning (Elo & Kyngäs 2008, 109). Krippendorff calls the units 
of analysis recording units, and the “textual matters that set limits on the information to be 
considered in the description of recording units” (Krippendorff 2004, 101). In my research, 
the recording unit is the idea. Since the ideas are expressed very briefly, I have also had to 
take into account the larger context units, such as related comments or extra information, for 
example about the phase of conflict or who controls which oilfield at that moment or if the 
comment is an answer to somebody else’s comment. 
 
The first phase is to reduce the material by excluding everything irrelevant to the research 
question (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, 109). Reducing can be done by coding all the relevant 
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expressions or units of analysis from the material and by summarizing their information in a 
brief expression (ibid). 
 
The second phase is clustering, which means that the coded expressions are categorized 
according to their similarities and differences (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, 110). The criteria for 
forming a category can be a feature, a property or a perception of a phenomenon (ibid). The 
categories, all of which are given a name that describes the content of the category, can be 
used to preliminary analysis of the phenomenon (ibid). 
 
In the third phase, abstracting, theory-tied analysis is different than material-driven. In 
material-driven approach, the researcher creates theoretical concepts from the categories 
found in the material (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, 111), and in theory-tied analysis the 
categories are linked to the previously known and introduced theoretical concepts (ibid, 117). 
 
3.1.4 Problems of content analysis 
 
Even though content analysis has a reputation of being an “overly simplistic method” (Elo & 
Kyngäs 2008, 113), there are several pitfalls that a researcher has to avoid. For example, one 
of the problems of content analysis as a research method is that a research is often unfinished: 
the material is analyzed and categorized, but no conclusions have been made of it (Tuomi & 
Sarajärvi 2009, 103). The goal of the analysis is to organize the material for drawing 
conclusions, but they are not results as such (ibid). In my research, I took this into account by 
dividing the findings and the actual discussion into the separate chapters, which helped me to 
first introduce the findings and then, draw conclusions from it. 
 
One of the challenges is to find a balanced number of categories. Too many categories mean 
that a researcher has been unable to categorize; too few of them means that the analysis 
process has been incomplete (Elo & Kyngäs 2008, 113–114). The related challenge is to 
compress the material sufficiently without losing the richness of the material during the 
analysis process (ibid). To avoid these pitfalls, I created both the main categories and their 
subcategories and described both them in order to maintain the richness of the material. 
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3.1.5 Realization of the research 
 
I started my analysis by reading carefully the chosen media texts and familiarizing myself 
with the material. After that, I reduced the material by distinguishing the parts in which the 
representatives of the conflict parties speak about oil related to the conflict. I coded those 
statements by using different colors to distinguish which text parts were from the rebel side 
and which were from the government side. 
 
After that, I clustered the reduced material by creating preliminary categories according to 
what was said and how it was said and copy-pasted the excerpts under the headlines, making 
notes simultaneously. Having categorized all the excerpts, I summarized their main ideas and 
named the categories accordingly. After revising all the categories and comparing similarities 
and differences in them, I abstracted the categories by organizing them into main categories 
and subcategories according to the main idea and the meaning of the main category. 
 
3.2 Material 
 
My research focuses on the published statements of the conflict parties of South Sudan and 
how they themselves connect oil and the conflict, and how this reflects the wider social and 
political context. I use news media as my material. It is common for the conflict parties to use 
news media to promote their cause for the local people and to the international audience 
(Öberg & Sollenberg 2011, 61–62), and the South Sudanese conflict parties are not an 
exception. The news media is the easiest way to get access to the propaganda of the conflict 
parties, because at least at the time when I was collecting the material, the rebels did not have 
their own websites (Sudan Tribune 16.7.2014) and the speeches of the president are not 
archived in the internet. Since these medias publish the statements of the both sides and also 
those of the other actors, they seem to be part of the “negotiation arena”, a space and a 
network of social relations that the different actors use to negotiate the power relations which 
construct a state (Hagmann & Péclard 2010, 550–551). In addition, the media material, which 
includes the interviews of other leaders and representatives than just Salva Kiir and Riek 
Machar, is much more diverse and rich.  
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I use news articles of two news websites, Sudan Tribune and Bloomberg, as research material. 
These two websites were chosen because they have covered the South Sudan conflict since its 
beginning and they both follow closely how the situation in the country evolves. They are also 
the most logical choice for catching most of the oil-related statements regarding South Sudan, 
because Sudan Tribune publishes statements of both the government and the opposition and 
Bloomberg follows closely how the situation in the country impacts oil industry. It is likely 
that most oil-related statements are published at least in either of these. Even in cases where 
statements are published in both, they are likely to complement each other, because they have 
different audiences and thus, different point of views (Öberg & Sollenberg 2011, 56). 
 
Sudan Tribune is a France-based non-profit news website, founded in 2003 and run by a team 
of “independent Sudanese and international journalists and editors” (Sudan Tribune: About). 
Despite its name, it publishes news both from Sudan and South Sudan from many 
perspectives. There are both English and Arabic versions of Sudan Tribune (ibid). In this 
research, I used only the English version. 
 
Bloomberg, on the other hand, is a company founded in 1982, which describes itself as 
“private network with data, analytics and other financial information” (Bloomberg: History). 
In addition to offering services to financial professionals, Bloomberg publishes news around 
the world, including South Sudan. Bloomberg has 15,500 employees in 192 different 
locations (Bloomberg: About the company). 
 
The articles which were chosen for the sample were from the time frame 15.12.2013–
15.12.2014, or exactly one year after the conflict started. I used three criteria for selecting 
articles for the sample: 
 
1. The article is a piece of news, not an opinion, meaning that the goal of the article 
was to deliver information in a neutral way, and not express somebody’s opinion 
or present an argument, 
2. The article addresses the current conflict of South Sudan, thus excluding the Abyei 
conflict and low-scale inter-tribal clashes, and 
3. In the article, the word “oil” is mentioned in relation to the South Sudan conflict 
by a representative of conflict parties, namely the political and military leadership 
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of the SPLM/A and the SPLM/A in Opposition or other high-ranking 
official/officer representing the conflict parties. 
 
The sample of the chosen articles will be available on request for five years from the 
publication. 
 
3.2.1 Limitations of material 
 
There are several problems associated with using media texts as material, especially in the 
conflict contexts, and I will address them below. One of the obvious problems is, though, that 
the news articles are, actually, interpretations. In order to write a coherent text, journalists 
make an interpretation from the diverse material and from different voices (Fairclough 1997, 
102). A researcher has to especially critical, when the text describes intentions or other 
unobservable issues, because they are most likely only interpretations (Öberg & Sollenberg 
2011, 62–63). 
 
In order to minimize the risk of studying journalists’ interpretations instead of stated 
intentions of the conflict parties, in the analysis I have focused on direct and indirect 
quotations of the conflict parties or their representatives in the analysis. Even though indirect 
quotations are without a doubt interpretations and the framing of the direct quotations affects 
how they are interpreted, with a critical analysis they can be useful in finding out how the 
conflict parties themselves think about oil and the conflict. This is one of the reasons why I 
decided to use content analysis instead of discourse analysis: with content analysis, the focus 
is on the meanings and the basic message of the text and not how these meanings are 
constructed (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009, 104). 
 
Another limitation of using the media texts and propaganda is that one can never be sure to 
what extent the given information is true: it is possible that the conflict parties use the media 
for bluffing (Öberg & Sollenberg 2011, 53). For the most part, the truthfulness of the news 
items is not that important for my research: I am interested in perceptions and meanings given 
to oil by the conflict parties, not whether the perceptions are true. There is, however, a danger 
that even the goals of rebel organizations are misinterpreted by the media, as happened in the 
case of the second civil war of Sudan and the SPLM/A that was labeled as secessionist (Öberg 
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& Sollenberg 2011, 51–52). I try to avoid this problem by focusing on the statements of the 
conflict parties themselves (direct or indirect quotations), and by familiarizing myself with the 
origins of the conflict from several sources. 
 
A serious limitation is that while the propaganda can be useful in analyzing perceptions, it is 
impossible to reveal any possible hidden agendas or even the secret motives of the conflict 
parties. For example, with my material, it is practically impossible to prove or disprove the 
arguments that the conflict parties’ real motivation to fight is to get access to oil money, 
because no politician or rebel leader in their right mind would say such a thing aloud. By 
analyzing published texts, I can only analyze how the issues are represented and justified in 
public by the conflict parties.  In order to do study motivations behind the public, deeper and 
more profound material is needed. 
 
3.2.2 Additional issues of the media in a conflict context 
 
Even though media texts are useful material for research, there are several pitfalls which have 
to be taken into account. One of those issues is selection bias: what is reported in the news is 
only a fraction of what has happened in reality. To increase the reliability of my research in 
this regard, I use two different media sites. 
 
The piece of news has come through a multiple phases of selection, editing and processing by 
journalists and editors, whose decisions depend on the news value criteria and the target 
audience (Öberg & Sollenberg 2011, 53–56). Thus, one has to be especially critical when 
analyzing media texts, because they are never absolutely true or complete. In this research, 
this was not that serious problem. By focusing the quotations of the conflict parties 
themselves, I aimed to avoid the interpretations of the journalists.  
 
The related problem is the center-periphery bias: the most media attention is given to the 
politically and economically important core areas of the world (Öberg & Sollenberg 2011, 
54). For example, developing countries in Africa are one of the periphery regions that are not 
much covered (ibid). In the case of South Sudan, this was not a problem: the international 
nature of the oil industry ensures media attention. 
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One of the potential dangers of using the media is a risk of re-circulation of information 
which is taken as a fact even though it might not be (Sollenberg & Öberg 2011, 60). It is 
possible that some numbers or “facts” are circulated in several second-hand reports, making it 
look like it has been verified several times, even though all the second-hand reports may have 
only one primary source (ibid). This is problematic, because it is difficult to distinguish what 
is the original source of certain facts, and therefore, difficult to find out whether that fact 
actually is true (ibid). In my material, this kind of re-circulation is clearly seen in the oil-
related numbers. In most of the oil-related news of South Sudan it is stated as a fact that South 
Sudan gets 90–98 % of its revenue from oil, even though according to the African Economic 
Outlook (2014, 2) the real figure is nowadays closer to 70 %. Using multiple sources to check 
the facts is one way to minimize this risk. 
 
3.2.3 Introduction of the material 
 
In the final sample, there are 65 articles from Sudan Tribune and 37 from Bloomberg. The 
reason why there are so much less of Bloomberg articles may be because the two web pages 
have different target audiences (Öberg & Sollenberg 2011, 56): Sudan Tribune is more 
focused on South Sudan and it might have more articles on just South Sudan, whereas 
Bloomberg covers issues on a global scale and with a variety of topics. Another reason might 
be the fact that Sudan Tribune publishes more statements from the South Sudanese leaders, 
while Bloomberg relies more on international experts’ and other foreign actors’ statements 
and analyses. 
 
 
 Dec  Jan Feb March April May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Bloomberg 12 4 3 1 7 5 0 1 0 3 1 0 0 
Sudan 
Tribune 
7 11 7 7 13 4 3 4 2 1 3 3 0 
Table 1. Number of articles of Sudan Tribune and Bloomberg. 
 
Both of the web pages published news from the South Sudan conflict since the December 15, 
when the fighting began and followed closely how the situation escalated into a full-scale 
civil war and how the peace process faced constant difficulties. Both of the web pages also 
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published reports of the suffering of civilians and comments of the humanitarian 
organizations. In addition to the conflict-related issues, the news items also commented on the 
political and economic situation of South Sudan and quoted both South Sudanese politicians 
and officials and also several international experts. 
 
In both Sudan Tribune and Bloomberg, the oil-related comments by the conflict parties are 
most often short, but they are often framed with the general information about the South 
Sudanese oil industry. In Bloomberg, these framings are more focused on amounts of oil and 
the companies extracting oil, while Sudan Tribune emphasizes more the oil dependence of 
South Sudan. In Bloomberg, the oil-related comments were included already into the first 
reports of the conflict; in those, the representative of the government assured that the oil 
production has not been affected by fighting. In Sudan Tribune, oil is mentioned only after 
days of clashes and it becomes an issue when Riek Machar announces on December 23 that 
he will cut the oil revenue flow to Juba. This indicates that oil has a role, but it is probably not 
the most acute grievance or the most important popular demand of the rebels. 
 
Most of the oil-related statements are published during the first months of the conflict, 
especially from January to summer. After summer, the oil practically vanishes from the 
propaganda, even though oil fields are still targets of fighting (e.g. Sudan Tribune 10.10.2014; 
27.10.2014). There might be several reasons for the absence of oil-related comments. One of 
the possible explanations could be so called news fatigue: when the same pattern continues 
for a long time, it will not necessarily be reported because it does not have a news value 
(Öberg & Sollenberg 2011, 59). On the other hand, there might have been other pieces of 
propaganda more interesting than the oil issue. One of the potential more interesting issue 
might be the progressive steps taken at the peace negotiations, which cover much of the media 
space and has been the focus of attention of the conflict parties in the autumn. It is also 
interesting to note that oil is not mentioned at all in relation to the peace negotiations, even 
though the conflict parties comment and criticize the propositions of IGAD in public very 
openly. It raises questions whether oil is excluded from the agenda of the peace process. 
 
Even though oil is not necessarily one of the root causes of the conflict, there are enough 
statements by the both conflict parties to prove that oil is definitely an important part of the 
conflict. In the next chapter, I turn to the more detailed analysis of the role of oil in the South 
Sudan conflict. 
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3.2.4 Conclusion 
 
Despite several limitations, media texts are useful while analyzing the propaganda and the 
perceptions of the conflict parties. I have chosen two news websites, Sudan Tribune, which 
follows closely the South Sudanese politics, and Bloomberg, which follows the situation from 
the point of view of oil industry, and analyzed the oil-related statements by the conflict parties 
with content analysis. Content analysis is the most logical method for analyzing the main 
message and the meaning, and it has a long history in the research of mass media and war-
time propaganda. 
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4 ANALYSIS 
 
The oil-related statements of the governments and those of the rebels are very different and it 
would be incoherent to introduce them simultaneously, so I have separated them. It seems that 
oil has more important role in the rebels’ rhetoric than in that of the government: whereas oil 
is a part of a strategy for the rebels, the government focuses on assuring that it is in control. 
 
The tone of the statements of the both parties changes during the war. First, the government 
assures that everything is fine; then it admits that there are problems, but they will be solved; 
finally, the government has to admit that the conflict has seriously damaged the oil fields, and 
thus, the economy of South Sudan. The role of oil in the rebel strategy seems to change also. 
First, the rebels intend to control the oil fields and continue the production; later, the strategy 
is to stop the production in order to prevent the government using the oil money. In the rebel 
propaganda, oil is inherent part. In the table below, the main categories of statements, or the 
main changes, are presented in a timeline. The red boxes are the main categories of the 
government statements and the blue boxes are those of the rebels. 
 
Dec 
13 
Jan Feb March April May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Timeline of the main categories. The red boxes are for the government and the blue 
boxes for the rebels. 
 
 
Everything under 
control 
Problems will be solved 
Damaged oil fields 
Oil-related propaganda 
Continuing oil 
production 
Stopping oil 
production 
International aspects 
 45 
 
4.1 Analysis: the government 
 
The statements of the government representatives can be divided into four main categories, 
two of which have several sub-categories. These are presented in the table below. 
 
The first main category, “Everything under control”, includes two sub-categories, “Oil fields 
under control” and “Cooperation with Sudan”. The statements of this category aim to create a 
sense of normality and continuity of oil production despite the conflict. 
 
The second category, “Problems will be solved”, consists of three different sub-categories, 
“Problems are not serious”, “Defending oil fields” and “No need for military assistance”. The 
main message is that the problems for oil industry caused by the conflict are admitted, but 
their significance is downplayed, and the capability of the government to fix the problems is 
emphasized. 
 
The third and the fourth categories do not have sub-categories. In the third, “Damaged oil 
fields”, the government admits that the conflict has severely damaged oil industry and the 
South Sudanese economy. The need for financial assistance and permission for Chinese 
peacekeepers to secure the oil fields are admitted. In the fourth category, oil is used as a tool 
for propaganda. 
 
The excerpts from the material are chosen because they were the most frequently presented in 
the material or because they crystallize the idea of the category. 
 
Table 2. Categories and sub-categories of the government statements. 
Main category Sub-categories 
Everything under control Oil fields under control 
Cooperation with Sudan 
Problems will be solved Problems are not serious 
Defending oil fields 
No need for military assistance 
Damaged oil fields 
Oil-related propaganda 
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4.1.1 Everything under control 
 
Oil fields under control 
 
The statements of the first sub-category were published around December and January, 
straight after the conflict started. In this sub-category, the South Sudanese government 
officials assure that the on-going fighting has not affected to the oil production at all. Despite 
rumors and temporary evacuation of some workers, the government is in control of the oil 
wells, and oil flows normally. 
 
"The oil fields are safe. There is no problem. They are under control”, he said. [Ateny 
Wek Ateny, the spokesperson of South Sudan’s president, ST 25th December 2013] 
 
Cooperation with Sudan 
 
The majority of these statements were published in January and February: a more critical 
statement was published in May, and after a long pause, the next one, emphasizing 
cooperation, in November. Within this sub-category, the cooperation and good diplomatic 
relations between the governments of Sudan and South Sudan are emphasized. The 
representatives of the governments discuss ensuring the oil production in the South Sudanese 
oil fields, oil flow through the Sudanese pipelines and the needs of the oil companies. In 
addition, the South Sudanese defense minister announced that if needed, his government may 
request military assistance to secure oil fields. In the only critical comment, in which the 
South Sudanese minister criticized the decision of the Sudanese officials to welcome the rebel 
leader Riek Machar to Khartoum, the oil was mentioned as a sign of good relations between 
the two governments. 
 
"Until now we have not asked the Sudan government to send in their forces" to protect 
South Sudan’s oil fields, the minister said. 
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"Should there be a threat, anything threatening the oil field, definitely the government 
of South Sudan may ask the Sudan government to come in and support," he added. 
[Kuol Manyang Juuk, Defense Minister of South Sudan, ST, 17th January] 
 
4.1.2 Problems will be solved 
 
Problems are not serious 
 
The statements of this sub-category were published in a time period from the end of 
December to the mid-April. The government officials and ministers admit that the oil 
production is hampered because of fighting. They also admit that, first, part of the Unity state 
oil fields are controlled by the rebels, and later, that the whole oil production has stopped. On 
the other hand, the ministers and officials assure that the problems faced by the government 
are not that serious and will be fixed: the oil production still continues partly and more troops 
will be sent to secure oil fields. Even the situation of Unity state was seen in a positive way. 
First, the oil shutdown of the state was assured to be only temporary. When the ministers and 
officials admitted that the oil production in Unity has stopped completely, they emphasized 
that all the oil wells of Upper Nile state are still under the government’s control, and Upper 
Nile is the state that produces the most of the South Sudanese oil. 
 
Production slowed at the Unity field because of the attacks and output should be 
returned to pre-attack levels soon, South Sudan Petroleum Minister Stephen Dhieu 
Dau said by phone today. The government is sending forces to secure oil fields and 
prevent more attacks, he said. [B, 20th December 2013] 
 
While oil production has been halted in Unity state because of the violence, output in 
Upper Nile state has been unaffected so far and is pumping 160,000 to 200,000 
barrels a day, South Sudanese Foreign Minister Barnaba Marial Benjamin said Feb. 
11. [B, 19th February] 
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Defending the oilfields 
 
Most of the statements of this subcategory are published between the last day of December 
2013 and the end of May 2014, and the majority of speakers are military officers. The officers 
assure that the army is capable of defending the oilfields from the rebel attacks and the 
heartland of the oil production, Upper Nile state, is safe. The tone of the statements is very 
defiant and at times, even pompous. At the same time, they tell about the repulsed attacks of 
the rebels and dismiss the threats posed by them. 
 
Paloch is “where we will be buried,” Vasili, an in-law of Kiir, told reporters at an oil 
field 20 minutes drive from the town of the same name, saying that rebels don’t have 
the capacity to take control of the oil fields and Paloch . “We are not running from 
this place.” [Major General Gregory Vasili, an oil defense force commander, B, 31st 
December 2013] 
 
South Sudan’s only oil fields still pumping crude after four months of conflict are safe 
from rebel attacks, the army general charged with defending them said. 
 
Rebel leader Riek Machar’s threat to seize the Paloch oil field in Upper Nile state is a 
“joke,” Lieutenant-General Johnson Gony Biliu said in an April 14 interview in the 
state capital, Malakal. Insurgents can’t reach the fields through the war-ravaged town 
and have failed “five times” to seize Paloch by another route, he said.  [B, 17th April] 
 
No need for military assistance 
 
The statements of this sub-category are published between the beginning of January and the 
beginning of May. Most of the statements focus on denying the reports of South Sudan asking 
for assistance to protect its oilfields. The first reports were published in January, when the 
Sudanese foreign minister announced that Sudan and South Sudan establish a joint force to 
protect the latter’s oil fields. Later, both Sudanese and South Sudanese politicians denied this. 
Other statements deny also that South Sudan has asked assistance from other IGAD member 
countries; it is corrected that South Sudan did not request anything, but the member countries 
of IGAD themselves offered to deploy forces to protect the South Sudanese oil fields. The 
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point seems to have been that the South Sudanese government wants to assure that it is 
capable of defending its oil production facilities without outsiders. 
 
Sudanese and South Sudanese governments denied on Tuesday reports that presidents 
Omer Al-Bashir and Salva Kiir a struck a security deal to deploy joint forces to 
protect oil areas in South Sudan. [ST, 7th January] 
 
"I did not say the government of the republic of South Sudan had asked for deployment 
of troops from IGAD member countries. I said the government of the republic of South 
Sudan had received a proposal from individual IGAD member countries seeking to 
deploy troops to protect oil fields," he stressed. [Ateny Wek Ateny, the spokesperson of 
South Sudan’s president, ST, 7th March] 
 
4.1.3 Damaged oil production causes problems 
 
Most of the statements of this sub-category take place in March, April and May 2014, but 
there are single comments throughout the year, the first one in January, the last one in 
October. The speakers, mainly representatives of the Petroleum Ministry and the Finance 
Ministry, finally admit that the conflict has affected the oil production, which has serious 
consequences to the economy of South Sudan. Oil production has been declined by a third, 
Upper Nile is the only state still producing and even there, there are declines. South Sudan has 
been forced to take loan from the oil companies and delay repayments of existing loans. The 
Finance Minister says that South Sudan lives “hand to mouth” (Bloomberg 28.5.2014). In one 
of the last statements, the Foreign Minister announces that Chinese peacekeepers are deployed 
in the oil fields in order to secure these “vital installations” (Bloomberg 10.9.2014), which 
can be seen as a sign of weakness after the defiant statements about being capable of 
defending oil fields and about not needing military assistance. 
 
South Sudan borrowed $200 million from oil operators and postponed repayments on 
domestic loans after the country’s six-month-old conflict cut crude output, the 
government’s main source of revenue, Finance Minister Aggrey Tisa Sabuni said.  
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Loss of about a third of revenue led the government to seek advances from oil 
producers in South Sudan over the past five months, Sabuni said today in an interview 
in the capital, Juba. The government also asked to delay payments due on loans to 
commercial banks and shelved plans to improve the country’s infrastructure, he said. 
[B, 28th May] 
 
4.1.4 Oil-related propaganda 
 
In the material, there were only two occasions in which the government side used oil as a 
clear propaganda against the rebels. In May, an official accused the USA of being in the side 
of the rebels because of oil (Sudan Tribune 15.5.2014). Later, in August, President Kiir 
warned that the rebels will become a regional threat and used the rebel attacks against oil 
fields as an example of the cruelty of the rebels, calling them terrorists (Sudan Tribune 
31.8.2014). 
 
“If they are not given meaningful and serious attention by the region and the 
international community involved in this peace process, I am sure that their activities 
would reach other countries and when this happened, the conflict will be a regional 
issue,” he said.  
 
If today like they did before, they attack the oil area, they will not spare anybody. This 
is [a] terrorist act,” he added. [Salva Kiir, president of South Sudan, ST, 31st August] 
 
4.2 Analysis: the rebels 
 
The statements of the rebels can be divided into three main categories, each of which has 
several sub-categories. These categories are presented in the table below. 
 
The first main category, “Continuing oil production”, consists of three sub-categories, “No 
deliberate damage to oil fields”, “No oil money to government” and “Cooperation with 
Sudan”. The main message is that the rebels aim to control the oil fields in order to continue 
the production, and even if some of the facilities are damaged or the production is partially 
halted, it is not deliberate. The rebels intend to use the oil money themselves. 
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The second category, “Stopping oil production”, there are three sub-categories, “Fight for 
control of oil fields”, “Starving military budget” and “Forced oil shutdown”. The common 
denominator for these sub-categories is the goal of the rebels to control the oil fields and stop 
the production in order to prevent the government using it. Unlike in the “Continuing oil 
production” category, within this category there are no signs of willingness to continue 
production or taking over the oil revenue. 
 
The last category, “International aspects of oil production”, is the most diverse, and consists 
of four sub-categories: “’Blood oil”’, “No foreign forces to oil fields”, “Role of China” and 
“Oil as a possible sanction”. In this main category, the role of oil is especially political and 
sensitive, and the different roles of international actors are commented and criticized. The 
common idea is that some international actors and peaceful international interventions are 
welcomed (such as using oil as sanction or contributing to the development of oil industry), 
any kind of meddling into the conflict is not tolerated (such as the government using oil 
money to hire Ugandan “mercenaries” or to buy Chinese weapons, or IGAD or the UN 
sending peacekeepers to secure oil fields). 
 
As in the case of the government statements, also in the excerpts from the rebels’ material are 
chosen because they were the most frequently presented in the material or because they 
crystallize the idea of the category. 
 
 
Main category Sub-categories 
Continuing oil production No deliberate damage to oil fields 
No oil money to government 
Cooperation with Sudan 
Stopping oil production Fight for control of oil fields 
Starving military budget 
Forced oil shutdown 
International aspects of oil production “Blood oil” 
No foreign forces to oil fields 
Role of China 
Oil as a possible sanction 
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Table 3. Categories and sub-categories of the statements of the SPLM in Opposition. 
 
4.2.1 Continuing oil production 
 
No deliberate damage to oil fields 
 
In this sub-category, most of the statements were published between the end of December 
2013 and the end of February 2014. The rebels admit that the oil production has been 
hampered because of lack of workforce due to evacuations. They also emphasize that any 
decline in the production is not their fault, and definitely not their intention: the decisions 
were made by the evacuated oil workers themselves. In addition, the government is accused 
of oil shutdown, criticized of ignoring the livelihoods of people. The government forces were 
also alleged of looting the oil facilities. Later, in summer, the rebels announce that even 
though they would be capable of attacking and controlling the Upper Nile oil fields, they will 
not do it in order to not to damage oil installations. 
 
James Koang Chuol, who took control of the army’s fourth division in Unity state on 
Saturday, told Sudan Tribune that he had not ordered the shutdown, saying the 
decision was taken by oil technicians who were evacuated from the area on 25 
December. [ST, 26th December 2013] 
 
In a separate statement, Koang also accused the government forces of resorting to 
looting the facilities in the oilfield of Paloich in fear of imminent attacks as Akoko is 
closer to the oilfields. [Brig. Gen. Lul Koang, the spokesperson for the rebels, ST, 23rd 
February] 
 
He said while rebels had the ability to attack and control oil production areas in 
Upper Nile state, Machar had halted forces progressing further on oil fields located 
near the Sudanese border for fear of damaging oil installations. [Yohanis Musa Pouk, 
SPLM-IN-Opposition spokesperson, ST, 7th June] 
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No oil money to the government 
 
All of the statements of this sub-category were published between 23rd December 2013 and 
mid-February 2014. Most of them cite the interview of Riek Machar, who announced being in 
control of oil fields and allowing the oil companies continue production under protection of 
his forces, and diverting the revenue from Juba to an escrow account until the conflict is over. 
The other statements echo Machar’s interview. The main points are that the continuation of 
the oil production is in the interest of the rebels, the oil revenue should not go to the 
government and that the rebels assure they know how to manage the oil money responsibly. It 
is even suggested that the international community should be in charge of the oil revenue. 
 
“We’ll protect the oil workers, the oil companies, the oil installations and the oil can 
be transported and sold,” Machar said by phone from an undisclosed location. 
Revenue from crude sales will be placed in an escrow account “until the conflict is 
over,” he said. [Riek Machar, the leader of SPLM in Opposition, B, 24th December 
2013] 
 
"We do not want to close down the oil because other parties would be hurt. Closing 
the oil fields has not been one of our objectives otherwise our forces would have 
closed them down long time ago because we control 90% of the areas where oil is 
produced in both Unity and Upper Nile state", Mar said on Sunday. [Hussein Mar, a 
representative of the SPLM in Opposition delegation in the peace negotiations, ST, 
16th February] 
 
Cooperation with Sudan 
 
All the statements of this sub-category were published in December, in the context of the 
rebels announcing their will to continue oil production, while diverting the revenue from 
Juba. The rebel leaders said that they would take over the implementation the cooperation 
agreement with Sudan, which concerns the use of the Sudanese pipelines by South Sudan. 
Interestingly enough, there are no other comments or statements regarding the “hijacked” 
cooperation agreement and whether it worked out, or how the Sudanese authorities react to 
this. 
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He said no money would go to the government in Juba, explaining that his group 
plans to divert oil revenues and deal directly with Sudan in implementing the 
September 2012 cooperation agreements, as they are in control of the concerned 
states. [Riek Machar, the leader of SPLM in Opposition, ST, 23rd December 2013] 
 
 
4.2.2 Stopping oil production 
 
Fight for control of oil fields 
 
Most of the statements of this sub-category were published between January and June, and 
after a months-long pause, one statement was published in November. The statements were 
made by military officers from the rebel side, and they were mostly reports of fighting around 
the oil fields and of which oil fields are under the rebel control. In many statements, the oil 
fields were mentioned as an intermediate goal for something bigger, such as taking over Juba 
or ousting President Kiir. Many of the statements also emphasized that it was the government 
forces who had initiated the fight, sometimes even during the ceasefire, and the rebels had 
only defended themselves. In the last statement, it was also suggested that the government 
forces deliberately aim to recapture the oil fields before the permanent ceasefire is signed. 
 
"Our forces have now taken full control of Leer county, Mirmir and Tharjiath oilfields 
in the operations to clear the state from the pro-Salva Kiir soldiers and their foreign 
mercenaries,” he told Sudan Tribune by phone from Bentiu. [Lt. Col Peter Riek Gew, 
rebel military spokesperson ST, April 19] 
 
“The government is entirely responsible for these unnecessary attacks motivated by its 
desires and attempts to recapture oil fields under our control before a permanent 
cessation [of hostilities] agreement could be signed,” Koang said in a statement 
extended to Sudan Tribune on Monday. [Brig. Gen. Lul Ruai Koang, the spokesman 
for rebel forces ST, 10th November] 
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Starving military budget 
 
The statements of this sub-category were published between the end of March and May, and 
they are made by Riek Machar and other rebel leaders. They announce openly that they are 
going to capture oil fields, especially the ones in Upper Nile state, in order to deprive the 
government of oil revenue for military purposes. By starving a military budget, the rebels aim 
to prevent the government (or the president) of buying weapons and to force the president 
either to step down or to take the peace negotiations seriously. In these statements, it is clear 
that the rebel leaders see that the government finances the war efforts with oil money, which 
makes oil fields legitimate military targets for them. Controlling the oil fields is not an end 
itself, but only a means to attack the president. The nexus between oil, conflict and economy 
is recognized. 
 
“We want to take control of the oil field,” said Machar, dressed in green military 
fatigues and wearing gold-rimmed sunglasses. “This is our oil. We must take control 
of Paloch to deny Salva Kiir revenue to buy more arms.”  [Riek Machar, the leader of 
SPLM in Opposition, B, 31st March] 
 
Forced oil shutdown 
 
The first statement of this sub-category was published in February, and the rest in April. In 
the first statement, the rebels threaten to enforce an oil shutdown if the government forces 
continue attacking their positions (Sudan Tribune 16.2.2014). The rest of the statements dealt 
with the capture of Unity state by the rebels. After the capture, they asked the oil companies 
in the government-controlled areas to leave and evacuate their staff within a week, or face the 
risks. 
 
South Sudanese rebels seized the capital of oil-rich Unity state, demanding companies 
in government-held territory suspend crude production and evacuate staff within a 
week.  
(…) 
The insurgents urge “all oil companies still operating in government controlled areas 
to immediately embark on gradual and voluntary closure of oil production,” Koang 
said. “Failure to comply with this request, the oil companies risk forced oil shutdown 
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and the safety of their staff.” [Brig. Gen. Lul Ruai Koang, Rebel military 
spokesperson, B, 15th April] 
 
4.2.3 International aspects of oil production 
 
“Blood oil” 
 
These statements were published from February to October, and most of the speakers are 
high-rank soldiers of the SPLM in Opposition. They criticize President Kiir and his 
government of using oil money to hire foreign mercenaries, such as the Ugandan army and 
some Sudanese rebel groups, and buy arms in order to kill his own people. The weapons 
purchases and military expenses are contrasted with the people dying of hunger and diseases. 
The sharpest criticism is aimed at the Ugandan army, which has fought alongside the South 
Sudanese government since the beginning: the Ugandans are called as “mercenaries” and they 
are accused of using banned weapons and of keeping Kiir in power only because of 
benefitting from the oil money. This category can be linked with a de-legitimization discourse 
of Kiir used by the rebels in justifying their struggle against his government. 
 
The rebel officer accuses Kiir of using the country’s oil money to hire foreign troops – 
namely the Ugandan army (UPDF) and Sudanese rebels – to kill his own citizens on 
ethnic grounds. 
(…) 
“What legitimacy left to someone who is killing his own people with foreign allies? 
Salva [Kiir] has forgotten that these very people he is killing are the ones who had 
voted him into the office five years back”, he added. [Gen. Gathoth Gatkouth, a 
commander of SPLM in Opposition, ST, 5th February] 
 
Uganda, JEM and SPLM/A-N are now being paid by dollars that comes from the oil in 
Bentiu. Uganda is a war merchant in the region, they are in DRC Congo, in Central 
African Republic, Somalia etc, and would not want to see an end to this conflict soon 
and we are ready to battle it out with them. 
 (…) 
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Yes, they [the international community] should stop the flow of the oil because it is 
being used for financing mercenaries and war. There is blood oil now flowing in 
South Sudan. [Oyet Nathaniel Pierino, officer of SPLM in Opposition, ST, 27th March] 
 
No foreign forces to oil fields 
 
The statements of this sub-category were published between the end of March and the end of 
May. The statements, by the military leaders of SPLM in Opposition, are about rejecting all 
proposed deployments of foreign forces to protect the oil fields. First, Ethiopia, Rwanda and 
Kenya propose to send forces. The proposal was rejected by Riek Machar, stating that these 
forces would be treated as enemy and deployment of them in the oil fields is colonization. 
Second, after the mandate of the peacekeeping mission UNMISS was extended to protect 
civilians around the oil fields, the rebel leaders argue that this means that the UN has taken a 
side of the government by ensuring the flow of oil money, and thus, by keeping President Kiir 
in power.  
 
The deployment [of Kenyan, Ethiopian and Rwandan forces] would be “hostile” and 
treated the same as Uganda’s army fighting alongside South Sudan’s military, 
Machar said. 
  
“They’ve no right to deploy in our oil fields,” he said. “If they want to colonize us we 
will fight them.” 
[Riek Machar, the leader of SPLM in Opposition, B, 31st March] 
 
“By stepping in to protection Oil Installations on behalf of the government, UNMISS 
will have sided with one of the parties to the conflict and inevitably becomes part of 
the problem not solution,” he said. [Brig. Gen. Lul Ruai Koang, the rebel military 
spokesperson, ST, 29th May] 
 
Role of China 
 
The statements of this sub-category were published between the end of June and the end of 
October. The statements reflect the paradoxical relationship between the rebels and China. In 
the first statement, Riek Machar describes China as “an important partner” in oil production 
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and calls for cooperation with the Chinese in dealing with the suspended oil operations in 
Unity state. Next statements, on the other hand, challenge the role of China in the conflict: 
according to the rebels, China is time providing loans to the government and selling weapons, 
oil as collateral, and providing soldiers to the UNMISS in order to secure oil fields (Sudan 
Tribune 18.7.2014). Thus, China fuels the conflict in the oil-producing areas, but at the same 
time, China sponsors the peace process. The criticism and concern over the role of China is 
expressed in relatively diplomatic language. Later, after the rebel delegation paid a visit in 
China requesting it not to sell arms to the government, the discussion turns to the safety of 
Chinese oil workers in South Sudan. It seems that while the rebels do not accept the 
assistance given to the government, they do not wish to antagonize China. 
 
“The People’s Republic of China is also providing arms that are fuelling the conflict 
in South Sudan through its arms manufacturer, China North Industries Corporation 
(NORINCO). These loans and arms are guaranteed with oil as collateral,” Mabior 
said in the statement. (…) The government has armed militias using these arms to 
persecute its barbaric war in South Sudan especially in the oil producing areas,” he 
further stressed. 
 (…) 
He said the SPLM-In Opposition is concerned by the role that China is playing in the 
South Sudanese conflict. [Mabior Garang de Mabior, the chairperson of the national 
committee for information and public relations of SPLM in Opposition, ST, 18th July] 
 
Oil as a possible sanction 
 
The statements of this sub-category were published in the summer, during July and August, 
and most of them cited Riek Machar. Machar criticizes the sanctions targeted at the military 
leadership of the parties by the USA and the EU as inefficient and argues that the regional 
sanctions by the IGAD countries would be more effective. He points out that blocking the oil 
flow from South Sudan would bring peace to the country soon, and asks the government of 
Sudan and Kenya to be courageous enough to deny the access to the ports. 
 
 “If Khartoum would take the courage and say the oil from South Sudan is not going 
to flow through its pipelines, this would be very effective indeed,” said Machar at the 
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press conference to mark the third anniversary of South Sudan’s independence from 
Sudan. [Riek Machar, the leader of SPLM in Opposition, ST, 10th July] 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
 
Judging by the statements by the conflict parties, it seems that at least the conflict parties 
think that oil has a role in the conflict. The central role of the oil in the South Sudanese 
economy makes oil as a strategic resource which both of the parties intends to control to win 
the war. The main message of the government is that it tries hard to keep the oil fields under 
control and keep oil flowing, and when it fails, the representatives of the government admit 
that the damaged oil industry has serious consequences to the economy. On the other hand, 
major part of the rebel statements consists of plans to capture the oil fields, either to take over 
oil production or just to prevent the government using the money for war efforts.  
 
It was particularly distinctive how the rebels complemented their anti-government propaganda 
by the oil-related statements. The rebels used oil as a propaganda tool in de-legitimizing the 
government and especially the president by claiming that he uses oil to hire foreign 
“mercenaries” and buy weapons abroad to kill his own people. This propaganda is most likely 
aimed at the South Sudanese themselves, to create a picture of the president as a ruthless, 
corrupted warlord who has to rely on oil money and foreign troops to keep him in power. The 
government did not use oil that much in the war propaganda, but instead, tried to assure the 
investors to continue the production and investing in South Sudan and prevent the unsure ones 
from leaving. 
 
The international aspects of the oil production were also visible in the statements, as were a 
sense of sovereignty and ownership: economic cooperation was welcomed, whereas almost all 
proposed military interventions were rejected by both conflict parties. Especially the rebels 
criticized vehemently all possible interventions to protect oil fields, arguing that this would 
mean taking sides or even the colonization of South Sudan. Even though the government had 
received military assistance from Uganda, it declared for months that it is capable of 
defending the oil fields and rejected all the rumors about military interventions by Sudan and 
other East African nations. 
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5 DISCUSSION 
 
It seems that the South Sudanese conflict parties consider oil as an essential part of the 
conflict. Among other meanings, it is a strategic resource for the government and a legitimate 
target for the rebels. In addition, the South Sudanese oil industry is dependent on several 
foreign actors whose interests the South Sudanese belligerents have to take into account. 
 
According to the resource curse theory, the impact of natural resources on civil wars is 
indirect: abundant natural resources encourage corruption and patronage politics, which 
weaken state institutions and make the state vulnerable for political upheavals. The “greed vs. 
grievance” model suggests, however, that natural resources are one of the ways in which the 
conflict is financed. What do my findings mean from the point of view of these theories? In 
this chapter, I discuss the role of oil in the South Sudan conflict in the context of the resource 
curse theory, the “greed vs. grievance” model and the political situation of the Horn of Africa. 
As the South Sudan conflict and the role of oil are also linked to the broader debate about 
what is state and legitimacy, I discuss briefly the interpretation of the conflict as a negotiating 
statehood and the role of oil in this process. 
 
5.1 Before the conflict 
 
South Sudan is, without doubt, an extremely oil-dependent country: the government receives 
70 % of its revenues from oil (African Economic Outlook 2014, 2). Oil industry and the 
related investments are the drivers of economic growth in the otherwise poor country (ibid). 
Therefore, it is difficult to underestimate its centrality to the South Sudanese economy and 
politics. 
 
Large reserves of oil are not necessarily a positive issue, because according to the resource 
curse theory, natural resources can have adverse effects on economy and politics. Dependence 
can weaken the state institutions and encourage corruption and patronage politics, and thus, 
indirectly cause conflicts (Humphreys, Sachs & Stiglizt 2007). In the South Sudan case, it is 
clear that institutions are weak, corruption is rampant and politics is based on patronage 
networks (e.g. Radon & Logan 2014), but whether the resource curse is reason for the current 
conflict, needs to be discussed in more detail.  
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The resource curse suggests that the resource-dependent countries have weak institutions 
because they do not have to tax their citizens, which leads to lack of connection between the 
ruling class and the citizens, lack of accountability and lack of a social contract (Karl 2007). 
In South Sudan, the state institutions, such as legislative, judiciary and the army, are without 
doubt weak (e.g. ICG 2014a; Radon & Logan 2014). Oil wealth has probably contributed to 
this situation, but it is not the only reason: the problems South Sudan faces are enormous (e.g. 
Minale 2012; Blackings 2012). 
 
Blackings (2012) argues that the failure of state-building by the South Sudanese government 
is caused because of inability of the SPLM/A to transform itself from a guerrilla movement 
into a political party; according to him, the SPLM/A has reaped all the benefits of the 
independence in the form of power, prestige and corruption at the expense of the rest of the 
population. In this sense, oil has most likely contributed to the situation. Because of the 
reliance on oil money, the SPLM/A has never had to form a social contract with its citizens, 
and the citizens are unable to held their government accountable (Radon & Logan 2014, 160–
161). Therefore, it can be assumed that reliance of oil wealth and the related corruption can be 
linked to the fragility of the state institutions in South Sudan. 
 
The weak institutions increase a conflict risk by enabling the politicians basing their power on 
the patronage networks (McFerson 2010), by decreasing the ability of government to interfere 
in social and political conflicts (Ross 2003, 25) or by weakening the government’s 
administrative control of the whole country (Fearon 2005). In South Sudan, almost all of these 
aspects have contributed to the outbreak of the conflict. 
 
The reason for why a simple competition on political seats could escalate so dramatically can 
be found in the weak state structures. The executive, or the president, has unreasonably 
amount of power in relation to the legislative and the judiciary, which makes the office of 
president prone to competition, and also, leaves the legislative and the judiciary little options 
to balance the power of the executive (Radon & Logan 2014). For example, the parliament of 
South Sudan was unable to intervene in when President Kiir replaced most of his cabinet in 
July 2013 (Radon & Logan 2014, 157), and also the judiciary, independence of which is 
questioned, has failed to resolve the internal disputes of the SPLM (African Economic 
Outlook 2014, 8).  
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The South Sudanese politicians base their power in ethnic patronage networks, and in the 
current conflict, the affiliation of certain ethnic groups with the leaders was one of the reasons 
why the conflict broke out (LeRiche 2014; Radon & Logan 2014, 150–151). President Kiir’s 
“big tent strategy”, a military patronage system, also contributed to the onset of the conflict. 
The SPLA was weak and divided, because different armed groups were “bribed” to join the 
SPLA with amnesties and high-rank positions and thus, root causes were ignored and 
rebelling was unsanctioned (ICG 2014a, 5–6).  Thus, when strife between Kiir and Machar 
and the incidence in Juba in December 2013 provided a spark, the system based on ethnic 
loyalties and a fragile coalition of armed groups and militias collapsed. 
 
In theory, patronage networks can work, if the authorities “buy peace” by “bribing” the key 
segments of the society into compliance, for example through large-scale distribution or high 
military spending (Fjelde 2009). The problem is the expensiveness of the functioning 
patronage system, and not many resource-dependent countries can afford to it (Basedau &  
Lay 2009). In South Sudan, this was one of the problems: after the oil shutdown 2012, the 
economy was in a poor condition, which meant that the government had difficulties to buy the 
loyalty of its army (Radon & Logan 2014, 160–161). In this sense, one might argue that the 
bad economic situation create conditions for conflict (Auty 2004; Ross 2003). 
 
One possible resource curse mechanism, which seems unlikely in South Sudan, is the 
grievances in producing regions. Grievances in producing regions, whether the health or 
environmental problems or claim of the local population to own the resources, can lead to 
violence or even secessionist claims (Humphreys, Sachs & Stiglitz 2007, 13; Ross 2003, 27–
28). Statistical evidence supporting this kind of mechanism is mixed (e.g. Humphreys 2005; 
Ross 2004a). Neither the historical analysis of the conflict nor the results of my analysis of 
the conflict parties’ statements indicate that the motivations of the rebels would be secession 
of oil areas or defending suffering communities living in the producing regions. Thus, the 
results support the findings of Ross (2004a): most likely, there are real grievances in the 
producing regions, but they are not a cause of a conflict. 
 
One of the possible mechanisms of resource curse causing conflicts is capturing the state 
apparatus in order to get access to natural resource wealth (Humphreys, Sachs & Stiglitz 
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2007, 13–14). Because this mechanism is similar to the “greed vs. grievance” model 
mechanisms, I discuss it below. 
 
5.2 Oil during the conflict 
 
In this section, I discuss the role of oil during the conflict, especially from the point of view of 
“greed vs. grievance” model and of the process of negotiating the state. 
 
5.2.1 “Greed vs. grievance” model 
 
“Greed vs. grievance” model suggests that civil wars emerge when there are low costs for 
rebellion and when there is a chance to generate income (Collier & Hoeffler 2001). In theory, 
this is the case in South Sudan. The costs of enlisting rebels are low because the economy is 
ruined, most of the population is illiterate and does non-wage work (World Bank 2014a; 
World Bank 2014b) and there are plenty of uneducated young males (African Economic 
Outlook 2014, 10). The low population density (World Bank 2014b), undeveloped 
infrastructure (African Economic Outlook 2014, 6) and availability of the conflict-specific 
capital (Small Arms Survey 2014a) give a strategic advantage to the potential rebels. Oil gives 
a chance to generate income through booty futures (Collier et al. 2003, 77). 
 
Although the numbers support the “greed vs. grievance” model, one has to take a closer look 
at the dynamics of the conflict and the mechanisms of the “greed vs. grievance” model in 
order to draw conclusions. For example, all the theoretical assumptions about the impact of 
the resource on the conflict type, based on the “greed vs. grievance” model, do not match with 
the empirical data. According to Le Billon (2001), point and distant resource, such as the 
South Sudanese oil, should lead to a secessionist war, but at least in my sample of the 
statements of the rebels, there were no single mention of secession. Similarly, interpreting the 
conflict risk assessment by Auty (2004), oil is paradoxical: while it is a point resource, 
extraction of which does not require forming socio-economic links, which would increase the 
conflict risk, but at its weight/value ratio indicates that it is not very lootable, decreasing the 
risk. 
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The most prominent mechanism by which natural resources are assumed to affect to the onset 
of civil war is looting: that the rebels finance the start-up costs of the rebellion by the sales of 
natural resources (Ross 2004a). According to Ross (2004a, 40–41), in order to prove this 
mechanism one has to find evidence of pre-war extraction and sales of the natural resources 
by the rebels, and in his case study, he found no such evidence (ibid, 50–51). In the South 
Sudan case, it would be difficult or even impossible to find such evidence, too: the outbreak 
of conflict after clashes in Juba took everybody by surprise (Gordon 2014, 1). Since the army 
unraveled and the fighting started days before the existence of the SPLM-IO (Small Arms 
Survey 2014b, 5–6), the rebellion was hardly well planned in advance. 
 
On the other hand, as Ross himself (2004a, 50–51) admits, this definition of looting 
mechanism is not conclusive: in many cases, looting by the rebels started after the conflict 
began. Thus, the additional resources would lengthen the conflict by giving chance to the 
weaker party, or shorten it by giving the edge to the stronger party (ibid, 42–43). The 
underlying assumption is that the rebels are to ones who loot and they are the weaker party 
(ibid). 
 
The South Sudan case is somewhat more complex than that. It is clear that the government, 
which receives most of its revenue from oil (African Economic Outlook 2014, 2) and received 
loans from oil companies (Bloomberg 28.5.2014), has better economical chances to wage war 
because of oil. But, it is unclear that which side is actually the weaker one: during the first 
months of the conflict, 70 % of the soldiers defected to the rebels’ side or deserted (ICG 
2014a, 8), and while the government received military assistance from Uganda (ibid, 22–23), 
the conflict has not ended with a military victory of either side. The underlying assumption 
that the rebels are weaker than the government may not be accurate in the South Sudan case. 
 
Second, it is the government which is “looting” the natural resources, which are not just 
“additional resources”, but the very base of the economy and vital assets to the government. 
The word “looting” also raises the question who actually owns the resources in the first place. 
It is frowned upon to use oil to finance the war efforts (e.g. Sudan Tribune 18.7.2014; Global 
Witness 2014), but is it looting? Technically, the government uses the resources under its 
control to regain the monopoly of violence in its territory, which is far from illegal. On the 
other hand, if the owner of the oil is the South Sudanese people, should the rents be used to 
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improve the living conditions of the regular people instead of wasting it to the power struggle 
of the elites? 
 
The similar type of reasoning can be found in one of the mechanisms of the resource curse: 
that the rebels intend to capture the state apparatus in order to gain access to natural resources 
(Humphreys, Sachs & Stiglitz 2007, 13–14). According to the report of the “Enough” project, 
this is exactly what is happening in South Sudan: the politicians who were dismissed by Kiir 
were also cut off from their access to oil wealth, and the main goal of the rebel leaders is to 
gain back that wealth (Fleischner 2014, 9–10). In theory, this is possible, and taking into 
account the rampant corruption of the ruling class of South Sudan, it is likely that the rebel 
leaders have economic motives in mind. As discussed above, the conflict was hardly started 
intentionally, but it might be possible that after the outbreak, the opportunistic leaders used 
the opportunity to fight for the control of oil wealth. 
 
However, it is difficult to find solid empirical evidence about these kinds of hidden agendas 
and ultimate motives of the conflict parties and with the material I have, I cannot answer to 
this question. If the rebel leaders’ goal was the access to oil money, they would not say it in 
public; they would have to justify their actions to their soldiers and supporters in other ways. 
As the “Blood oil” category suggests, it is not irrelevant for the legitimization of the ruling 
elites how the oil money is used or how it is perceived to be used. 
 
In my material, there were no signs that the rebels would have wanted to capture the state in 
order to get access to oil money. Interestingly enough, this mechanism was presented in the 
opposite way: the rebels intended to capture the oil fields in order to capture the state, for 
example the “Stopping oil production” category. In the most statements made by the rebels, 
oil had only instrumental value in achieving the main goal: capturing the state apparatus was 
the end, and capturing the oil fields was just a means to achieve it. It is possible that for the 
rebels, oil is just a strategic resource; it does not exclude the possibility of hidden agendas of 
the rebel leaders; they would have to justify the attempts to capture the oil fields without 
revealing their economic motives publicly. But, as discussed above, this subject needs further 
research. 
 
Nevertheless, in the statements, it was the government that was criticized of using oil money 
to finance the war, not the rebels. The role of oil was extremely politicized in the rebel 
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statements. Using oil to finance war efforts was disapproved as ethically questionable (“Blood 
oil”) and was used to justify the attacks to oil fields as pre-emptive defense (“Starving 
military budget”) and thus, made oil an essential part of the conflict. This politicization can be 
seen also in the category of “No foreign forces to oil fields”: even the UN peacekeepers are 
treated with hostility when they are mandated to protect civilians around the oil fields. The 
main reason for this politicization of oil is probably the oil dependence of the government: if 
oil money was not that important to the government and its war efforts, oil would not have 
become as critical target for the rebels. 
 
The same ambiguity goes with the issue of booty futures, which are related to looting: in their 
statements, the rebels accused the government of using oil as collateral in ensuring loans 
(Sudan Tribune 18.7.2014), and the government admitted receiving loans from the oil 
companies (Bloomberg 28.5.2014). This suggests that although it is unclear whether the 
government really has sold extraction rights in advance, it has received financial support from 
actors whose interest is to extract oil under protection of the government. The rebel case is 
more complex. The statements of Machar about continuing oil production and protecting the 
oil companies can be interpreted as a call for financing, but it is unclear if it is succeeded or 
not. If the rebels have sold the extraction rights of oil fields in advance, asking oil companies 
to leave (Bloomberg 15.4.2014) and suggesting that oil should be sanctioned (Sudan Tribune 
15.7.2014) would be against their interests. 
 
There is evidence that the natural resources might have impact on severity of a conflict. 
According to Ross (2004a, 45) battles over resource-rich areas can increase the number of 
casualties, and according to Lujala (2010), existence of hydrocarbon production make 
conflicts more severe measured in the number of battle deaths. In South Sudan case, it seems 
that oil producing states Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile have been severely affected by the 
conflict (e.g. UNSC 6.3.2014, 3–5; UNSC 25.7.2014, 3–5; UNSC 18.11.2014, 3–5), and in 
the categories of “Defending the oil fields” and “Stopping oil production” and even 
“Continuing oil production”, the conflict parties admit that they have been fighting over the 
control of the oil fields and producing areas. 
 
The change of the rhetoric of both sides might also indicate the increasing severity. The 
government’s assurances (“Everything under control”) change gradually to the admittance of 
serious problems (“Damaged oil fields”) as the conflict continues. Similarly, in the beginning, 
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the rebels’ aims change from using the oil fields for their own purposes (“Continuing oil 
production”) to just stopping the government using it (“Stopping oil production”) or even to 
put oil under sanctions (“Oil as a possible sanction”). One of the possible interpretations 
would be that as the conflict continued, the severity of the battles increased and thus, 
controlling the oil fields became more and more difficult. There is a good possibility that the 
South Sudan case confirms the arguments of Ross (2004a, 45) and Lujala (2010), but this 
subject needs further research. 
 
5.2.2 Negotiating the state: oil in repertoires 
 
The state, legitimacy and the relationship between the ruling elites and the ruled have been at 
the center of the political philosophy for centuries. The South Sudan conflict and role of oil in 
it can be also seen as a part of this broader debate about what state is and how the leadership 
of state legitimizes its dominance. According to Hagmann and Péclard (2010), the state 
should be seen as a process in which the various actors negotiate the relations of power. The 
actors, some of whom have better resources and better opportunities to have their voices heard 
than the others, have to legitimize their claims of power by using symbolic repertoires, such 
as ethnic or religious identity or ideals of good governance and democracy.  
 
Hagmann and Péclard (2010) are critical of the current discourse of state fragility and 
institutional weakness for being normative by judging the African states for not being 
successful in the Western standards. They argue that the African states are not fragile or failed 
but simply more complex and contested than the Western ideal, and in this context, the 
conflicts are merely phases in which the negotiations and changes in relations occur rapidly 
(Hagmann & Péclard 2010, 556). The alternative interpretation of the outbreak of the conflict 
within this context would be to see it as a continuum for a negotiation process in which the 
president and the critical politicians attempted to reorganize their power relations. During the 
conflict, the new players, such as the rebel organization SPLM-IO, arise in the negotiation 
arena in which the power relations are arranged (ibid, 551). Although the analysis of the 
typical African politics is reasonable, there is a serious problem within this approach: it 
presents the conflict, which has caused suffering to thousands of people, as natural and 
acceptable way to solve the political disputes, and it does not offer any possible solutions. 
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Normative as the state fragility discourse and the related resource curse theory might be, they 
at least portray civil wars as problems. 
 
Despite the normative shortcomings, the notion of state as a process of power struggles 
between different actors is convincing. If the South Sudan conflict is seen as a negotiating 
process on what South Sudan is and who are legitimately in charge of it, then oil and oil 
money are extremely important resources for the main actors. The negotiating process is 
never inclusive or equal: those who have more resources, either material or immaterial, are in 
better position to shape the process (Hagmann & Péclard 2010, 546–547). Therefore, it is 
logical that the government aims to keep control of the oil fields and that the rebels intend to 
capture them: control over this resource might give an advantage in the negotiations, not just 
as practical leverage in peace negotiations, but also the stronger position in negotiating the 
power relations that defines the state. 
 
Another important aspect is that the actors need a way to justify their claims to power by 
using different cultural repertoires (Hagmann & Péclard 2010, 547). The rebels justify their 
struggle by praising Riek Machar as a democratic leader who promotes good governance 
(Sudan Tribune 2.3.2014), using the currently popular repertoires in the African political 
context (Hagmann & Péclard 2010, 547). They contrast him with picturing Salva Kiir as a 
dictator and using foreign “mercenaries” to kill his own people (e.g. Sudan Tribune 
16.2.2014; Sudan Tribune 17.2.2014). This propaganda is complemented by allegations of 
using oil money to hire foreign “mercenaries” and to buy weapons abroad. The idea is to use 
another cultural repertoire to create a picture of the president as a ruthless, corrupted warlord 
who “loots” the oil money and has to rely on the foreign troops to keep him in power. In this 
sense, the rebels use oil and the legitimate use of oil money as repertoires to justify their 
struggle, and thus, they politicize the meaning of oil in the conflict. 
 
What is underneath these repertoires and the debate of who is looting whose oil is the 
question of ownership of the natural resources and how to use the profits of the natural 
resources legitimately. Judging by the categories of “No need military assistance” and “No 
foreign fields to oil fields”, both of the conflict parties consider oil as a property of the South 
Sudanese. However, it seems that the debate on the ownership of the resources should be 
taken to the level of the peace negotiations, where the power relations are re-arranged and 
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negotiated. As one of the most important resources that any actor in South Sudan can have at 
their disposal, oil should be one of the top priorities of the negotiations. 
 
5.2.3 International aspects 
 
Although my research focused on the statements of the conflict parties, it was clear that the 
international aspects of the South Sudanese oil industry are important and that the leaders of 
the South Sudanese conflict parties have to take these international actors and their interests 
into account. Even though the South Sudan conflict is technically a civil war, several foreign 
actors are involved in it in different ways and for different reasons, which reflect the inter-
connectedness of the Horn of Africa region (Mesfin 2013) and the international character of 
the oil business. Even the oil companies, who have agreed to give loans for the government 
(Bloomberg 28.5.2014; African Economic Outlook 2014, 2), are in a way involved in the 
conflict by financing the war efforts of the other party. The situation might resemble a 
mechanism suggested by Ross (2004a, 56–57): possibility of gaining access to natural 
resources encourages international involvement, even though attempts to gain access or 
benefit from the South Sudanese oil do not necessarily mean strictly looting. However, the 
international involvement in the South Sudanese conflict and also the regional pipeline 
politics should be researched further. 
 
Sudan and China are the most relevant foreign players of the South Sudanese oil industry: 
China is a major investor, and Sudan is the owner of the pipelines through which South Sudan 
transports its oil to the international markets. Their special status was reflected in the 
statements of the both sides in the “Cooperation with Sudan” and in the category of “Role of 
China” of the rebels. 
 
Sudan supports the government, but it has been speculated that it might also covertly assist 
the rebels also (ICG 2014a, 24). Lacking other means of transportation of oil, both parties are 
dependent on Sudan and in their statements they – and especially the government – emphasize 
cooperative relations with the northern neighbor. In the rebels’ statements, however, the 
cooperation with Sudan vanished in the early phase of the conflict, and there have been 
reports of the rebels’ plans to build new pipelines, one via Djibouti and one via Mombasa, 
Kenya (Sudan Tribune 14.7.2014). This might indicate that the rebels are seeking alternative 
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routes for transporting oil to the sea instead of relying on Sudan and on more uncertain 
option, the planned LAPSSET pipeline (e.g. Patey 2014, 244–245). The pipeline politics in 
the Horn of Africa region will probably be a contested issue in the future years. 
 
Like Sudan, China is one of the major actors that neither side of the conflict wishes to 
antagonize. Only the rebels commented on the role of China in their statements, by criticizing 
it – in very polite terms – of its paradoxical position in the conflict: at the same time, China 
contributed troops to the United Nations peacekeeping mission (UNMISS), participated in the 
peace talks and sold weapons to government (Sudan Tribune 28.7.2014). Later, the rebels 
requested it to stop the weapons trade, which China agreed to do (Sudan Tribune 24.10.2014). 
It is noteworthy, that when the Foreign Ministry of South Sudan announced of the 
deployment of Chinese peacekeepers in the oil fields (Bloomberg 10.9.2014) – was it accurate 
or not – there was no public outcry by the rebels, as had been in all the other cases of 
proposed military interventions. 
 
China has faced the dilemma between pursuing its economic interests and with its traditional 
non-interference politics (e.g. Kuo 2012), and this contradictory politics regarding South 
Sudan and attempts to please both parties might be caused by the same dilemma. The current 
situation is similar to a difficult position of China after the independence of South Sudan, 
when China had to balance between the governments of the North and the South, which were 
at the brink of a war because of oil-related disputes, in order to benefit from its massive oil 
investments (ICG 2012). It can be assumed that while China is acting more proactively than 
ever before (Reuters 11.2.2014), by accommodating the demands of the rebels also, it 
attempts to avoid being stuck in the middle of the belligerents. 
 
In addition, the regional states have their own economic and political interests in South 
Sudan, and thus, interests in the resolution of the South Sudan conflict. South Sudan is, 
economically and politically, inclined to the East Africa: it is planning to apply for the 
membership of the East African Community (LeRiche & Arnold 2012, 203). In addition, the 
SPLM/A have long relationship with the IGAD countries Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia, which 
are also important trading partners of South Sudan (LeRiche & Arnold 2012, 203–206). One 
of their common interests is the LAPSSET corridor, a pipeline and a railway and road 
network from Ethiopia via South Sudan to the Lamu port, Kenya, which is among the biggest 
infrastructure projects in Africa (Patey 2014, 244–245). Later, land-locked with relatively 
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recent oil discoveries, Uganda (LeRiche & Arnold 2012, 204), has joined the project 
(Aljazeera 13.10.2013). 
 
The LAPSSET pipeline is a politicized issue in the Horn of Africa region, because it would 
change the regional dynamics. It would help the emerging oil industry of Kenya and give it an 
advantage in its pursuit of becoming a regional economic power (Obe 2012), end the 
dependence of the landlocked Ethiopia on the ports of Djibouti (Sudan Tribune 9.3.2013), as 
well as the dependence of South Sudan on the pipelines and the port of Sudan (Patey 2014, 
245). In addition, it would cause serious damage to the Sudanese economy by depriving the 
oil transit fees paid by South Sudan (Aljazeera 13.10.2013). The construction of the 
LAPSSET pipeline might worsen the relations between Sudan and South Sudan (ibid), but 
otherwise, it would be advantageous plan for the government of South Sudan. Instead of 
being vulnerable to the problems arising from dealing with an old enemy, South Sudan would 
be able to cooperate with the governments with which it had good long-term relationships. 
However the conflict ends and whoever is in the government of South Sudan, it is likely that 
the LAPSSET project will be on the agenda of the South Sudanese government. However, the 
security problems have troubled the project since its launch in 2012 (Patey 2012, 224–245), 
and the current conflict of South Sudan worsens the situation even more (ICG 2014a, 19). 
 
Although the interests were not explicitly stated, this economic inter-connectedness might 
explain why the East African countries (Bloomberg 31.3.2014) have offered to protect the 
South Sudanese oil fields. Since South Sudan is a “vital link of the regional economy” (ICG 
2014a, 18), it is in none of the countries interests to let South Sudan collapse completely. 
Even the UN Security Council expanded the mandate of the UNMISS to protect civilians in 
high-risk places, including the oil installations, and urges all the parties to guarantee security 
of the economic infrastructure (UNSC 27.5.2014). In this sense, it can be assumed that even 
the UN sees the oil industry as a vital part of the South Sudanese economy to be protected 
from fighting. However, the resolution as well as the other protection offers were rejected 
vehemently by the rebels with the category of “No foreign forces to the oil fields”. Hence, the 
different meanings given to oil can cause misunderstandings: because the rebels have 
politicized the meaning of oil as a strategic resource which gives an advantage to the party 
controlling it, from the rebels’ point of view, protection of oil fields was seen as taking sides 
or even colonization. It is noteworthy that even though the government denies all the rumors 
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of requesting assistance for protection of oil fields, it does not object suggestions by the 
international organizations. 
 
In the statements of both parties can also be seen a certain sense of sovereignty and ownership 
of the oil fields in South Sudan. For example, the government keeps assuring for a long time 
that it is not asking any military assistance regarding to the oil fields (“No need for military 
assistance”) and that it is capable of defending them from the rebels (“Defending oil fields”). 
Even when there are clear signs that the rebels threaten the oil fields, the government 
reassures the international community and investors that it will be able to overcome all 
troubles. In similar fashion, the rebels oppose vehemently and in strong words all the 
proposed foreign military interventions. All this can be interpreted as a sign of that the 
conflict parties share an idea: even though the economic, peaceful cooperation is welcomed, 
the oil belongs to the South Sudanese. The South Sudanese leaders have made this clear for a 
long time ago: the oil shutdown in response to the unreasonable demands of Sudan was not 
only a risky move, but it was also clear message that the South Sudanese are in charge of their 
own oil (Patey 2014, 229). The statements of my material reinforce this message. 
 
The issue of oil seems to be very international and its role in the conflict comes up in the 
international contexts, such as in the debates on the protection of oil fields or in the news 
articles of Bloomberg. It would be worth of further research to find out what the people of 
South Sudan think about oil industry and its connections to the conflict. Is oil problem only to 
the elites and the international actors or does it concern ordinary people as well? 
 
5.3 Oil after the conflict 
 
According to UNEP (2009, 22), natural resources can play a role in post-conflict recovery if 
they are used to support the economic growth or to develop sustainable livelihoods. High-
value commodities, such as oil, usually yield high revenues and rapid economic growth, 
which is essential for the recovery of the post-conflict society (ibid). Because natural-resource 
related conflicts have a high risk to relapse into a new conflict, it is essential that after peace is 
restored, the natural resources are managed transparently and sustainably to prevent the 
relapse (ibid, 19). 
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Achieving peace does not seem to be easy in South Sudan, and even though the durable peace 
agreement would be signed and implemented, the question of the fair distribution of oil 
wealth will be difficult. This far, most of the peace talks have focused on the repeated 
ceasefires and power-sharing agreements, and even if oil has been in the agenda, the debates 
have not reached the public at least during the period I collected my material. It is 
questionable whether the possible peace agreements will change the actual situation: the laws 
regulating the South Sudanese oil industry are advanced, but the implementation is weak 
(Global Witness 2012), which enables the massive corruption in the country. If the conflict 
parties are the only relevant stakeholders in the peace talks, the management of the oil 
industry will hardly change, because the main belligerents, if given the positions in the 
transitional government, will benefit from the status quo. 
 
The amount of the South Sudanese oil reserves is another issue to discuss. There are different 
estimates of how much there is oil left and for how long South Sudan can rely on its oil wells. 
For example, according to LeRiche and Arnold (2012, 171), oil wells will be sustainable only 
a few years; Radon and Logan (2014, 163) estimate that oil wells will dry in the next ten 
years.  This matter was completely ignored in the conflict parties’ statements, but it should be 
taken into account, as well as the destruction and damages of oil fields caused by the conflict. 
This question should be taken seriously, especially because of the oil dependence of South 
Sudan. 
 
However much or little oil reserves South Sudan has the country is and will be dependent on 
those reserves. Oil brings most of the government revenues, GDP and exports (African Econ 
Outlook 2014, 2); manufacturing sector is non-existent, most of the people live on subsistence 
economy and only 27 % of adult population is literate (World Bank 2014b). The most 
potential non-oil sectors are agriculture and mining gold and copper, but no sufficient steps to 
develop and improve these sectors are taken (LeRiche & Arnold 2012, 180–184). In addition, 
the insufficient infrastructure, persistent insecurity and weak institutions are efficient barriers 
that prevent South Sudan to develop its economy into more global-oriented and non-oil 
dependent direction, if not addressed in a meaningful way (African Economic Outlook 2014, 
2). In sum, in near future South Sudan is in no position to diversify its economy, and at the 
moment, it seems that South Sudanese conflict parties are destroying their future hopes of 
economic recovery. All of these problems are exacerbated even more by the current fall of 
crude oil prices, which will put the oil dependent producer countries to a difficult position 
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(US Energy Information Administration 10.2.2015). What the conflict parties should realize is 
that the prize of the fighting will be a destroyed country with ruined economy and 
diminishing resources. 
 
Therefore, durable peace agreement and its effective implementation is what South Sudan 
needs most urgently. This far, the attempts to negotiate peace have been ineffective at best: it 
seems that IGAD and the international community either do not have political will or capacity 
to pressure the belligerents to peace, and without any pressure, the conflict parties do not have 
incentive to change their behavior (Fleischner 2014; Akol 2014). Effective sanctions, such as 
travel bans, asset freezing and trade embargoes, are needed desperately, and the only 
countries that can do it with sufficient force are the Horn of Africa countries, China and other 
oil importers. Most of the assets of the South Sudanese leaders are in the neighboring 
countries (Fleischner 2014, 6), and as discussed above, halting oil imports from South Sudan 
would put at least the government on their knees. In addition, the responsibility of private oil 
companies in financing the conflict should be discussed. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
Oil has several roles in the South Sudan conflict. It has, most likely, indirectly contributed to 
the outbreak of the conflict, it is a strategic resource for the government and thus, by 
politicizing the role of oil, it became a legitimate target for the rebels. Politicization was 
enhanced by the use of oil to complement anti-government propaganda and to reject the 
proposed military interventions. In addition, oil probably increased the severity of the conflict 
and possibly increased the interests of the foreign involvement in the conflict. Whether 
gaining access to oil wealth was the reason for the rebel leaders to engage in the war, needs to 
be researched further. The South Sudan conflict and the role of oil in it can also be linked to 
the debate of what is state and legitimacy: oil is an important resource for the actors who 
negotiate statehood and the related concepts are useful repertoires to justify their claims.  
 
Oil should be one of the main issues on the peace negotiations and the post-conflict 
reconstruction agenda, because of the relevance of oil in the conflict context and in the South 
Sudanese economy and politics in general. South Sudan needs durable peace in order to take 
advantage of its oil wealth as long as there will be oil to rely on, and manage it sustainably to 
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avoid the resource curse in the future. Diversifying the economy and economic development 
should be the priorities of the future governments of South Sudan. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this research is to find out whether oil plays a role in the South Sudan conflict, 
fought between the forces of Salva Kiir and the rebels of Riek Machar, in the time period 
2013–2014. The research can be divided into two parts: first, the historical account of the 
conflict and its origins, and second, the analysis of the propaganda of the conflict parties. The 
analysis of propaganda was done by collecting oil-related statements of the conflict parties 
from two news websites, Sudan Tribune and Bloomberg, and they were analyzed with 
qualitative content analysis. The underlying idea has been to follow Aspinall’s (2007) idea of 
focusing on the perceptions of the local actors about the role of natural resources. My research 
has been limited to the main belligerents, but analyzing perceptions of the regular South 
Sudanese as well as the interests of the international actors would give a more accurate picture 
of the conflict. 
 
Judging by the results of the analysis, it seems that oil has a role to play in the South Sudan 
conflict in several ways: indirectly before the conflict, as a strategic resource during the 
conflict, as a part of the cultural repertoires to justify the rebellion, and also possibly 
increasing the severity of the conflict, as a target of resource-battle and possibly increasing the 
interests of the foreign involvement in the conflict. Whether gaining access to the oil wealth is 
a root cause of the conflict, needs to be researched further. 
 
This case study gives support to the resource curse theory and its assumptions that natural 
resource dependence can contribute to the weak state institutions, and hence, to outbreak of a 
conflict.  The support for the “greed vs. grievance” model is more complex. The economic 
and social conditions of South Sudan are almost exactly like described in the “greed vs. 
grievance” model, but the exact mechanisms by which natural resources can contribute to the 
conflict onset are more obscure. It is clear that the government uses oil wealth to finance the 
war, which has made the oil fields legitimate targets to the rebels and politicized their 
meaning in the conflict context. This situation is more complicated than the simple 
assumption that the party which loots natural resources has an advantage and depending on 
whether that party is the stronger or weaker side, this advantage either lengthens or shortens 
the war. However, it is possible that constant fighting in the oil producing states has made 
conflict more severe, but this needs to be researched further. In addition to the debate of 
natural resources and conflicts, my research contributes to the debate of state and legitimacy 
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by suggesting that for the South Sudanese actors, oil is an important resource and the related 
propaganda is a useful repertoire to justify their claims on power when negotiating the 
statehood. 
 
The results implicate that the economic importance of oil industry is probably a reason why 
oil has become so important resource for the actors to fight for. Therefore, diversifying the 
economy and diminishing the oil dependence should be a priority to the political elites of 
South Sudan, as soon as the peace is restored. South Sudan will need to take advantage of its 
oil wealth as long as there will be oil to rely on. 
 
The oil industry of South Sudan is very international and various players in the region and 
beyond have interests in it. The international actors have influenced in the dynamics of the 
conflict in different ways by defining the environment in which the conflict parties have to 
operate. Inter-connectedness of the Horn of Africa countries and an impact of a major investor 
China are examples of this. Therefore, the Horn of Africa countries and the oil importers are 
in the key position to put pressure on the belligerents of South Sudan in order to achieve 
durable peace. 
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